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The Purpose of H~gel's Lectures on the. Philosophy · 
. .. ,;. ........... . 
of ·Religion · is - to demonstrate that the tr~'e nature of 
th~ relati~~eof religion an~ phil~sophy .ii dialect~cal; 
. . 
'('· . · . that it is. the nature of religion to undergo an inner . 
. . ' 
t;r:ansformation, the resUlt of wh-~ch is philosophy. No 
.. . 
attempt i~ m~~e- ~here to deduce ' reli~ion :r~m philos?phy 
or tp" €ffe-~t·, ·its .destruction at the hands _of · phiio~phy •· 
' • n 
\' 
,o 
. . . ,; -
- ·-· ~----
.· . .- : \· 
1.' '. 
. ·.· 
~ • r,. 




Rather 1 1 t 1s Hegel's · expr~ss aim to delineate ·. the ti;-ue 
··:· nature of relfg.i~n and in· so doing to preserve its 
independence from assimilation 'by philosophy~ 
. ~ . 
It ls the intentioh of this theSis· to defend 
·Hegel's arguments in the L·ectures. To this ·end, in 
'. •  <) • . 
chapter one , w~ present thre e critical v~ews which are 
• 1 
representative of the .opposition raised by. Hegel's 
arguments: All ~ail to consider seriqusly Hegel's 
.'contention that t _he · true nature of the relation i ,s 
dialec·t .ical a-yd_ all accuse him· of threatening the very 
existence of refigion . . To -saunter ~hese . cri~icisms ~e ·1: . 
f ' r ~ . 
~--· concentrate. on· examining and clarifying the n_ature o f 
' . t~e religious '>=onsciousness, or," Vorstellung, as ll~ge_~ 
· ca1ls l.t . 
To this e nd, chapter t wo e xamine s the r elat ion 
be tween . Vorstellung and reason 1 or philosophic "!--! tli?ught, 
. ..., 
. ,. 
















. • <ll 





on .the ' l~vel '. <?f psychology, t ,hat .is, as "faculties"' of 
. . ... 
mind.· This·formal · examina~ion enables us to see · more 
clea·rl¥ what Hegel me.ans by the· dialectical relationsh~p . 
.betwe,.en the two - h0w reason emerges as. the ' res~lt of 
\ • o I • ' 
the nature 'of ~orstellung .i~se~·f. ) 
T~L~ clarification and defense of Hege~ 90ntinues 
b • ' . 
in .chapter.three with an "exami nation of the concrete 
' - ... · 
I 
religious consciousness. There it is ~eveale~ that 
. •'] ' ~ ' ' 




. · .. ~ 
.. -·· ~ .. ·· 
undergo an inryer transforma}ion,9 the ·r¢sult <?.f which is 
_....:·-..,-· _ ·-- - --· ------·----:~'"~ ·-·- ' • • • • . - -- - ... ____ 2.__.:....:,. _____ :-----



















rec'og·ni tion, ... by religion, of the 'necessity of i .ts owR· · 
' . 
independent existence,. .. . 
·, 
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CHAP'rER j; . 
. I 
. OUTLINE OF THE· F-ROBLEM AND . ---· --- .------. 
·• REPI!ESENT~IVE CRIT~CAL tWs , .. -' 
.,. . .. . ( 1) Introd"Uction . 
. .. 
) • 'C • 
.. 
· Our airri is to ··. clarify Heg~l.'s con,cepti-on of· the 
; I 
relation :...of. · r'eligion-~an·d . p~ilos~ph~, l- ·~hrou·gh . an . 
··:. · .. e~aridnatio~ 'of the. f~~~ ~f ~he·· reii9i~~s ~o~~cio.us~Cs· ' 
.• 
. - • 2 
-wl)ich Hegel calls Vorstellung .. 
-. ~ 
In t;he first chapter -we iri_tend to provide a· 
~onte~t _for. the . later dis·cussion. Thls occu·i~ ·fir~t '.in 
. I ' . , , , 
/the · ~f:'nl 0_1: a 'gen.erai aCCOUnt. Of: H'egei I 5 t,rea.tment o'f 
. . ' . . ... '• . 
: r~li~ion' . and, . second~ ~~a a . brief summary of .thre.e 
critical evaluatibns of·.that .·trea,tmen.t, . which we consider 
I I . . . . • ' . 
' indicativ~ ~f. the general appro.ach ··to the qu~stio~, ar 
·. ' ·appr~ach--wi th which w~ · disagree. · _,. . · 
' I ' • 
. . 
. . 
. . ' ;. . 
;- . ! •.. ·we' prQceed. in chap'ter -..- two; by .examining ' the 
.I ' ' · • . • 
' 'I 
religious c·onsciousness in its pure1y :f .ormal ex.istenc.e ;_ 
. . . . - . . 
as the psychological · " 'fac·u1.ty" of_ Vorstellung., : or,. mental 
,., r , ' , ~ 
1 . . , . "" .. .· . .. 
· As elaborated in G;W. F., Hegel, Lectures on · the . ~- . 
. · Ph~1osophy' -of Religion-, tran~. E.B·; _: Speirs· and J. ·Burdon · 
San¢lerson (New Yo;rk: .. Humanities· 'Pres~ ·Inc.' , , 1968) ' 
Hereafter -LPR. · -- · · - · · · 
.' 2 
.;:, . The exqct meanil).g of t,his term can · only, be grasped· 
in,. -the-c0ntex't of the discussion· in chapters .two. and three·. 
Briefly it . may·. be defined' as tpe " f~eatibnal facul ty" ·of · 
mi nd. · , .· .. ·· · 
•, -, 
.. . . 













~ · ·_ 
..... ·. 
' . t ' • ' repr~sehtati,on. and - examine this "faculty ... in rel~tion to 
. I . - '· . 
that ·M reason. This phase of our study .,r'eveals that. 
. . 
relation· to· be dialectical·, is 
revealed as ehe 
l \:; n~cessary, logical prerequis · te of 
.! • 
I ' • 
. ' 
·'· 
latte_r . is s;en as the ,.,logical, an9 necessary-_ 
.' :'' 
reason, and the 
·-result of th.e former .. 
In .chapte~ three we move to· an ·examination of 
Vorstellung -in its con-crete existence' as . the religi\)US 
" 
1 .'· 
,t • • 
. . ' .. 
· consciousness-. This ' latter examination, co~rqbora ting · .. ·· 
. ' ' 
·t.he findings o~ o:~r · se~ond chapter · re~eals that 
.. ~I • ~ 
. . . 
the 
relation of religion· and ·philosophy' is likewise a · 
' . ,, . ' 
I 
.-. 
dialectical o_ne, such that- religion emerges ~s the: .necessary 
' -prerequisite· of philosophy and'·the latter is seen as the 
' . 
necessary end or·result · of religion itself~ 
I 
I . ' 
·.·. (2) HegefFs diSCl,lSSion o:f philosophy and religion, ' in brief. 
-. ' i' . 
The object of· a philosophy ·of religion, Hegel . :· 
states 1 is " ..• to co~sider 1 to 'examine a~d . to cornprkBend 
. . ( ~ ' 
. . • I .. 
,its [r.~ligion ' sJ'lnat.~re. ,J It is the natur.~. of th~s : 
,-comprehensiop ' · ~~ich gives rise to the question of th~ . · 
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. . ' ' ·.,:" .t :r tJ 
. .......... : ~.,· 
\ I ,. ~ • • I 'A 
·: .. '• .... ,; 
· ·' 'r· · 1 
''• 
'F 
· I ........ ,. . • •' I • 
" ' ·~ 
means unique with ·Hegel, however, having.. been a prevalent 
l~ . . : . . . 
point of ·contention throughout th~ ·whole histpry of" ' 
• 1 .weste~n t ·hought. The . question has -~lways -l:i.een ' asked ·in 
'''.the same way: . Can· philosop,hy ,. the pr_oduct of a rner·erly 
• l, ' ' • 
·.- human rea~on, ·-comprehend the' div:~11e \ru.ti} ~f religion, 
, . , - . 'i 
. 
. ,\ ' 
,.-' ··whi·ch ·is founded in f~ith? · . . . C.\ . · ··. 
• . . . . . The perl.od just/ prior -to -HJ~~l-' .s ·had answered. in 
_, I 
' 6 . 
' 
' . ' two diffe-rent, and, opposing ways. ifhe a'ge of the 
:. : .. · • enlightenplent, ~~ampionlng ' a~rt did: th.e supre.~acy 'of 
to faith a~d. :t~e religious atti tucie ,in ' · reason, denied 
' ·' . . . 0 
" .. ' 
' . . general any_ place in the. search for truth, relegating ·. 
i't in·s~ead to . the st.a ·t.~s· of·:~perstition ~~d ' ig~oranc~ . 
. . ' 
3 
, , ·.;· L} Th:is _ext:~me.".r~~-_ec~ion -~f religion by _the enl~ghtenme.n~ .. .. 
, .~ · ;J:~ ted .to the e~uil,_.lly .ext;re¥te ·. rejecti~n <;>f, reason, a -p9s~~ion·. 
-{~.!?' whi<;h i~ ~t the centre- of · romanticism. -
. l ' .f' ·, . 
~ 'f.. .. 1/··v 
·:.-1 
Hecj~i.' . ~~ntehds that both movements comirined . equa.liy 
' . ' /1 . :. . ' ' . 
·to destroy the" true ' nature · and significance· 'of · religion. 
• (1 ~· • • .. ~ 
._· .Approa~hi.ng the ~ ~uestion from tw~ wholly.--d-.iffer~nt side$· 
. ' •f ~-'- · , ' 
· · the~, nev~ith~less . haCJ. the s .ingle: effect ~~~- d·r _i vi~g . ~ 
I( ' f • 
' . we~e. betw~en religion ' :and philosophy an,d obscuring the 
' ' ' .. . 
< ' 
true nature of theil . relation. Hegel' claims :·th:at both . 




' • I 
. · 
·.,." . . : 
~ .. ~ . · .. -
.... 
'• 
. ~ ; 
\ •' . (: . i ' . 
. ®." 
a~ti tude ~·nd it j.:~ ·one of the . fundamehta.'l. ·aims of .th~ 
. Lectures 'to· resto;-e. religion 'to its ·. true sigri{ficance 
-
·. ' t 
than: to ·further . precipitate ·its de~truction· at . the hands. 
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- . ; 
" / 
. ~ . : 
__ ._._·. 
. .·l. ·' 
' · 
.. • ' 
:.~ t' 
·-o.f the latter. Hegel a'ims a"t" 'restoring rel:tgion thr_ough / 
ph~lo'sopli.y; : as . against b9th rationalism and romanti'cism: ... 
-- i 
. . We will notice:, in the second hiit;lf .?f this chapter I 
\ 
• ' 
that this cla~m o_f Hegel 1 s and the means of its. accomplish- o. 
. .. , 
ment ha've been larg~ly ignored by his' critics. 
' I ' '• •'.\.:• r 
It .- is · il! -th-e ·context· o.f .. an attempted 'reconci],iation 
. 6f 
4
religion and ph{losophy 1 then, t tfiat Hegel 1 s discuss~on · · 
i . -
in ~e Lectures must'.be seen. This reconciliat'iop takes 
bot}1 1a negative and_. a · posi_tive 'form. Negatively it ' takes 
:... 
the form o·f a sustained· cri tigue of enlaghtEmment · reason, -
. .' . . . I . . . 
t or 1 the "m~taphysics ·of the- ~nd~rstanding", ·which, 
. ; · -- I . . 
' ' ' . -
acco.r:ding to Hegel, ~rbi~r.qrily t judges. r~ligion, and 
1 • -~ ' • • 
-_.. .. attempts to reduce religious truth to absurdity · hy .' 
. ~-
demonstrating: its incompa-tibility with : t .he· knowledge~ that 
- tb._e u'nderstanding . has accumula~ed. Ag.ainst this· 
. . . . -
l ,; ~ 
. l . 
• 1,.~· • 
unpliilosophical form .of t.ho~ght, and as the positive pol~, .... 
- .· :, j 
. ' - . . ~ . . ~: ' - . 
Hegel- presents speculative philosophy, which ·seeks t9 · \ 
I ' ' " • ' .. . • 
know t .he concept or ·notion · of ~1igion, · ~o allow reli-gion 
. to develop and emerge -as a . r 'esult of ··its . own inner 
. . . . 
momentum. .Specuiative philosophy reveals. that· the 
I ~. ' 
/"Il)~taphysics of ·the und.erst~nd:Lng" .and the · faith bf the · 








:. . . 3 ;iii •• 
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. . 
.. . • , , I 
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' •' . 
.. , 
.. .. . 
. . . . .. ~ . .. .. ' 
' / - ~ .. .. '· 
'~ .. ·, .. 
·' -
-. 
- •; .'-. 
.. ,. 
I ·.'· -~ - . ~ " 
.. , 
_ , , · .. - . I 
' t . For this. reason, speculp_tive phil~~ophy ' (in •the 
. . . . I• a . 
guis·~ ·.<?£ a philosophy of r~li-gi~n) atte~pt~ to ·_explicate-
. \ I · ' . I - -
-the nature of religion, to cornprehertd .the nature of its· 
- . .,. / . - ~ 





• · r ' • .• I 
· . object-, God, and _the ·:form in which th.:¥s o~ject:':ris made . · 
.. 
:· 
/.,\ ' V. -''~ ., ~-1r · 
\'!,¢-•/ {;-).{ 
·manifest {_~·. relig.i,on _ . . It is in the proc~s- of unco~e~ing_ : 
tbe nature o:{ religion .. "in this way .that the true nature ·, 
. ' . 
,, 
' I ' .·~ of the relat_ion of religion and. philosophy emerges~. · ·0 
. . . . . i - · 
Heg:e1. ~egins .with' a brief disc_~ssion of .Wte ~~till;~.· 
. . 
of the · religious object. · Rel'igion .is · the ~~~leqge 'of . 
. 
1 
God,_ .of .His Universal and Infini t~. being, and not of any 
'¥inite object -. In ~this it~ is at one with philosophy, for 
. (]; - . 
· the latter, too·, is ·only concer.n'ed with . truth as· a wcto~e, · 
f • , • - • • • 
the Idea~ and not w·ith the nature :of Mnite objects . .. · He · i. 
. , . .., '. ' ! . I 
s _tate-.the relat,ionship thu_~:. . . ... ' ~ " :~ .! • the content, ·the need~ · 
.. ' 
· and the interest "bf .philosophy \represents something ~ which · .. 
" . . ' 
' 4 . . . it hap · in common with religion."- ·To .elaborate: :·. "The 
object of religion as wel·~ as ot' philosophy_ is- ete_rna,;t.:. 
tr~th i~ 'its obj'ectivity, 
the e~plicatd~n .of .God~ 11 ~ 
··1 
God· an~~ no~hin<i _:bu't G_?d·< .3nd · _· 
. 1'he . objects of 'phl.losopfiy and ' . 
. . . . . . . , . 
. . . 
;r~lig_ion are identical c3J1d as a - res~l t; I "philosophy ?n~y ~.. . · · 
, 
. ' 
4 . . 
· LPR, Vol. 
-- I 











• • •• f 
-
... 
tK _·· . 
\ 
I . ' 




._ ._· ,;. 
' ~ ._ 
q 
· ... 
.. . ··\.L 








~ . ... 
,. 
~· ... 
' . . 






I . ' 
. ', ' , ·~ 
. ' 
'.:' 
. . ', 
· '• 
I ··. ;· ~ .. -: . _-· .. ': . . \ ·.-.·."';~~ · ·r~·,: · ·.:> .. ' :,-,.'':J ;.. . . 











-. . . .. 
~ - .. . 
0 ' . . 
unfolds itself when it .up,~ol¢ls religio~·. and in ~n~o_lding 
. itself it · unfolds religi-on· .. .-.• ~ The ~ind in . so far ·a.s d it 
thinks ~hi l~s6phic~.lly ~mm~r~~s i isel"f .with : .-. living . 
• I 
'1 . . 0 • 
. inter'est in . this.' object I and renounces its 'parti'cular ~tY . 
\ • 
. ~ 
in· tl).qt ' if: 'permeates its. obj~·ct,··~i~ th~ - same way. _as · . 
., ·· ,. - , . . . ... •. 
.·, 
' r 
• ... • 0 •• 
reli_gi"ous .. ~onsc-iousn~ss does; "t0.r . t~e la'tt~r also 'does not :. 
. 
se.ek .to. ha~e any'thing ~f .i-t:.~ .owkbut. de·s~res only to .. 
· immlrse i.'t~e-lf in. · this ~ontent. 116; At the heart of this~ 
<) • oo I t 
, • statement ~ies· ~~e n:otion, . . -t:o ~e d:~~l~ped· ~n \ipter 
three,-t--fl.at--t.tle ~xpl.lcaa:tion of the religious o . ct by 
·philosophy, is essential to· the ·dev.elopment of · ··· latter's 
. ' 
'own self-cons~iousne'ss and, ind~ed, is d~pendent .on it. 
. Having claimed th~ two possess an ide.p.t'idal . , . 
• • , I ... • • "t Q - • • • • 0 I 
content, He~ei now outlines . the way irl .which· they 'are 
. ' , . . . ~ ' . 
I • 
t~·be distingui~hed. And it is ~egel's . fund~~eritar 
· cont;.entiqn that they 1are · dlst.inct and -must . r 'emain so;, 
. r •• 
· ·he is not adyancipg an argument \.fhi~~: see~d - to r-educe 
. philosophy to religion, or, . which: attempts ·to. transformr ' 
. . 
religion int.o· philosophy. ·Rather, · as we . hav'e already 
pointe d o:ut.·, hj· is. se'eR.ing t~ d~ . ~. ~stice ·-·~o. ~~lig.ion . and . 
to maiz:ttain · .~~s indepel}dent ':alue. .• Again , -.this is counter 
, ! 
· ... ·· "' 
.: ~ r. 
' 
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. I ~\ )J \\ 
0 0 0 J . 0 ·.~o'' the criticisms'· which· we sha:ll find advariceO. in'' seption 
• 0 
. 
t~6 ' of this chapter . . 
0, • # r ' 
I , 
Philosopfiy and religio~ are.dist~nguished by the 
• 
0 11 0' 0 ~ 
J ":'; f~or~ .'in ~hich ea~h. presents ~ ts opj ec;:,t, ~y th.e way· in 
• 1 • 
which each pe·rmi~s its object to emerge. Religion. 
, I t ' o · 
.•. . .presents its ~bject ~form of 0 a Vorst'5.:,).ung, or, 
0 0 
7 
~ . me~ tal~ representa't~Q~ ,j'Qr 1 " id~a; pbi.l.OS0phy presents itS object 
;··. in thE;i form._of reaso'n. 7 This di.fference between Vorstellung 
·'> •. . \ 
F. ll ·. D t rl • • 





betwe'en r~ligion ·.and .philosophy, I f=ind only thro'ugh a 
10 0. 0 • ' . ., . -caref~l ·study qf this diffY.rence 
.,::,.;. 
(which w~::attempt · i~ 
chapters two -and bhree) 
. I can the exa'ct· relation between . 
.. .. 
. ~~~i9~op. 'and ."phi:os~-hy t;J • for_H~gel b~ understood.' The · 
- ' ~differ~nqes between ~the t~o ~o~ms must wai~ . until th~h, 
" . . 
but . can be see h. supelf~ciali'y', ·. or'. ~bstra?tly, .th,roug'~ . a 
' 0 • 
distinction which Hegel ' makes between two meanings of 
• Q 0 ' • • • "' 0 F • 
the ~ord .' ~ignlfication' ··c •• 0 
I 
~egel . distinguishes <two·:.;rneanings ot _sig~ific.~ti~n 
~ " ' 0 
wpith 
. .;. . . 
aptly fe~press the difference betwe~n philosophy · 
0 • 
(;eason) . a~d ~ellgi~n (Vp~t~llung) • , · He conte~d·s that 
when W~ ~S~o What. t~~· sidnificance of ~omethi~g is We are 
0 , " 0 t • ' • • 
·asking two different and opposed gqestions. ·"In the • 
; - i 
)/ '" 
' o . 
0 / J 
.·.· -~ ,. 7 . ; 0 
· LPR,r Vol. I, p. 21.·. 
il 
' ~ 0 0 0. 0 













. . ' 
,. .. - · . 
' firstplace we call what we are th~nking ' qf, the meaning, · 
.. 
the e~d or intention, the general- thought:· of this or tha't 
" 
expression, work of.art, etc; . if we ask about its intrinsic 
. 
' character, it _is essentially the thought t hat is in .~t 
-. 8 
·of which we wish to have an idea". In this 'instance, 
when we· ask the meaning or: ·significance of' something we · 
. . ,,. . ./ 
. . 
are asking what end it w~s · inten~ed for, the thought · 
'" 
·which has gone. into . it ·and determ\ned 'it.. We wan.t to know 
the concept, or, ~ . . , (' . notion of the th1.ng, . " •. ·• and thus 1 t · · . 
follows ~hat the notion is · t~e si~nificance; ... "~ If.for 
• t 
exampie, we are asking- what. the term God signifies ·, in 
o I '/ 
'this case, "·· : it is· t~e Absolute, the nature of God _as 
'grasped by thought [ppeculative philos~phy], th~ logical 
I ~ 1\ ~ o/ 
knowledg~ of this .to which w,e d~sire to J·attain. "10 The .;· 
first mea_ning of signification requires, then, that we -
. _____ ..,__ _ I . 
. - ; · -::---. 
state the . th6ught cohtent of _·the given Vorstellung or idea. 
' I ~ l"'j 
.The second meaning which Hegel ~attributes to 
- ' - ... . 
significance emerges as . the oppos.i te of the- first'. In the first case 
. . . 
we were intent dn determining ·the thought content of our 
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c/"." .. ' 
content and ·'Wal'\t ·Low ~hat. it ~ignifies. · We now 
want ". ~ ~ an · .Lz or a pict-orial conception ~vorstellung] 




of the thought-determination, .... _an e;Kample of the 
~ ' 
• ·,. u .. 11 
content which has as yet onLy been given in ·t~ought. 
Thus we h<re ~he rev~rse or' the pr~v~cus ~eaning ... 




the philosophy of religion, and, _ as we stated above, -it ' ~ I .. 
is the purpose of the ·latter to m9,.-k'e th.~m explicit.· ·Th~ 
fulfilment of this·purpos~ is equ~lly the e~plication ~f h 
. . . . 
the relati~n . of religion and philo~op6y. · Th~ p~iiosophy 
of :relig iori in explicat-ing the nature · of th'e ·· religious 
., . . -. . ) 
conscious.p..ess, pr, the signi.ticance: of vorstellung, reveals 
it~. nature as a nec~·ssary· mod·e· o~ fruth' s manifest'a.tion, 
. ., 
and, i~s necessity to the ~mer~ence of the philosophical 
r-
. ~ ., 
consciousness. The phil~sophy of r~ligion reveals tbat 
I ' 
,- it is "in and ·through·"·religioiJ, or, Vorstellung, ·that 
• t lj 
the whol;e content of nature and _finite ~uman: ·spirit . 
··. 
receives the ·explicit form .of spirituality, or universality, 
• '\ .. • • ~ • 0 ' 
. . . ,, . 
which is the meaning of that term. for Hegel. It is 
thr-ough the tension which arises w_ithin Vorstellung CiS 
. . . 
. ,
it·;·strives to per'fect 'this actiyity, . and -:its ultimate -
• . . " .I I 
. s~lf-nega~ion in the re~~gnit~on that i~ is unabi~ to 
., 
.7 provide this universality ~ith its final form, .that 
ph-il"os?phy ·emerges. Philosophy";· ' then~ arises· only as a 
. ., ~ . 
result of this inner transformation -of Vorste~iung and 
. ., 
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'ernergenc~ .... · · F_a::; f~o~ destroyi~g·· ·r~1i~ion, ·tt. wi.l•l be ·seen 
. . 
that philo~phy i~. entirely d~pend~nt .on the .activit'y of 
.. 1 I ' I , 
"' .· · ..
the religi,o'u's consciousness and . the''refore/ has an essential 
. I . 
interest in pre~erving it; existence. ·. ~ . 
It is ·sufficient . here'that we have indi~ated ' the 
" 
. . . 
, purp~ose of · Hegel'' s/ Lectures , and the · directio_n. of their ·' 
. a~guments, which is ultimately to reveal the' nature of ( 
. . . 
t • • . 
... . the relation ·of re~igion and phiiosophy. We will' return 
o; . ·.~ ,. . r 
.. , 
to these Lectu,res iri · ~hapte:t three·. In· the immediately 
I 
following section we present'· tiiree crit.ical works which. 
- • 41;- • ' 
• I . . . 
~llustrate the usu~l app_roach ·to the question and towards 
. . . ~ 
which we have taken an . opposirf~ . view .. 
(3) Representative interpretations of Hegel's objectives 
The three criticisms which follow are representative 
. . 
of the usual approach taken to the question of the relation . 
of religion and philo~ophy in Hegel. Their conclusions, · \ 
·, 
-we will argue, are initiated by the in.adequacy of t:t:tei.r 
approach to what Hegel himself has to say on the subject~ 
~A) Copleston 
. ~ .. 
In an , qrt~ale entitled "Hegel and the Rationalizatio'n 
OfM t .. . · .. · llF 1 t h ' . ys 1c1sm ~ .c. · cop ~son states as ~s Eurpose, to 
'• r~ \ 
1'2 
In New Studies ''in 







Heg~lis . philosophy, ed. Warren E. 
Holt,: Rinehart and Winston Inc.,· 
.. ·. . ~ =--- . 











understand Hegel's intentions lin his philosophy of 
·· religion. After a· series. of general statements regard~ng · 
~egelrs .philosophical posi~ion . (be is an absolut~ idealist, 
according to C,opleston) an~ his religious beliefs 
· (Luthera~ Christian) he selects as a problem ~hat ·of the 
relation betwe~n .. the world anc!{l~~d, finite existen~~ and 
lnfinite Being. · Whil~ he does not make it ~le~r ~~ether 
. ~-
. this1 is a problem for religions in g~neral · or . j"~st_ fdr · 
·christia~ity, · copleston discus~e$ it only within the _ 
, . . - . . ' . 13 . . . . . ·, . . ' . 
context of the ~atter, ., spec~f~cally w~th~~ the context 
' of the Christian mystical tr~_dition: wh:ich · has sought to 
. ' 
overcome the relational "status of the divine and human 
worlds 'and achieve a '!Jni ty of the tw.r, without s~_cr.if.ic_ing 
· the limitedness of the one - or_. ·the divinity ·of the other. 
.. 
It is within this tradition that Coplest6n seeks 
' . 
. ' - ' ' . 
. to situate Hegel. Accordingly, he states that the latter ~ 
is · '' ~~ . trying -to give philosophical expressi_on to a 
. . ' 
-~ystical · 'ihsight·. "14 · In terms· -of our· own discus sian, · 
(which .d~es no . . injustice to Cop~st.on) , .we may charad:eri.~e . 
him as stat ing that Hegel is at~~ing - ~o transi~~~-- th~ :. · 
I ' < ( 
· content of·rel'igious language in.fo · that ·o{ ' philosophy. ~e " ·· 
I . 
. - , 
', 
. . . 
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1 3
_!lli., p. 189. 
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the- ~·r~tioi> tram vorstellun\t' t6-lhou~ht' ' ·. :::. d • 
How~,;.·er, while · coplesto~ 'appears·_to 'be · · awai:~ .··· · as .. are we. 
' I ~ ' ' ' ,. ' \, 
. . ~ ~· ' . ·. 
tha~ ~or H~gel sucn a transitiqn· occurs.necessarily a~ 
~· " o. ' ; I ' 
~ * ~ o ' o o I l\ o ' 
' . 
• • t • 0 
' . 
.. - I 
. ,. 
' \ ' 
.• 
... _. a fes.ult of 'the rligious ·.sta~l!dP9_int itpelf, he als9 . 
-a~~~~~s ~0 oe ·- i6t~lly' un~llliri;·: t~ ·i.~~d .that theory an~ -·::· . • "- '. , , <1 .. 
• .. j ' t • .. 
. ' 
c;redence'. · I 
... .. ... 
Coples~on ·ignores (am~ng ot?ei things') -~he ·.fact 
. ;· ' 
!\ •. ' • . • \ 0 ' • . 
. 0 
.. ~3- · .. · 
that for Hegel, :Vorstellung .o~ ·the reliqious standpoint, 
.. \). • • • ( • • • • f 
• =.. ~· 
. '\'' ... 
. . ' 





of this qualitative transformation \l,fithin religion itsel-f . 
. ·. , ; . ~ . . 
'Copl~s.ton 'g:l-ves · :th~ impression that Hegel is si.~ply. :.': .. 
... 
. . . . 
attempting to translate one .mode of discourse into another . .. 
. . 
, I 
This. cari be witnessed frc:>m his conc.}.tl\Sion~, for h~· g<?es · 
' . . 
on to "state that Hegel 1 s attempt to tr.anslate- ,·God' -'into 
the .:conc~p~s of s~·ecula,t.i\re p.hi,losophy, 9r, ~Absoiut~· ·:- ·" 
' . . 
.ll ... " -
are a failure. ·. (He goes so, far as to _·· say., ·; . 
' ; . 
· Idealism~' 
" . . r ' • • .. I 
. ... 
with McTaggart, that Hagel.' d.s· ~tternptirig . a tr~nsformati.on-. 
of Christiani.t; .in~·o· He(;jeli~~isni. Hj. The ··~"-ture· <;:f Gpd_ ' 
. . 
• ' ' • I ' 
· must, Copleston claims, remain hidden: " "H~gel ~ttempted, 
irt my op~nio~n, to dq- what ca~n:ot ,be done; ,namely to·-m~ke 
pl~in to view 'wha~ can - oniy · Q~ simply . appr~hended · thro~gh 
( 
• • • 0 16 
the ~se of analogie~ - and symbols." 
,, 




5Ibid., p. 18'9. 
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•I ', • . • . \ 
16Ibid. , · p _. 200. • I . .. >' 
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. t J " 
. . 
' . .. ~.t; . .. 
This ·last statement is '·perhaps the most iliuminating 
. 1-
ofa all ·: for it ·.clearly d~monstrates' that c;opleston ~as ' 
. ' . 
' ·, . . . ., . - . 
no real. in~ ling . . of Hegel Is conception of -the rela"ti.on 
. I . , • .. , . . I 
I .. . ~ . , 
of .. vorstellung aitd. thdught .eith,er ps.ychologically·br N 
. . . .·. . ' '.• t .. ·. . .. .. .. 
con·cre~ely. Copleston .here assert's ,the supr'emacy of 
.:.. ' .' . ' ~ 
( . "' . . ·' ·. . 
Vo;-stellung over t-ho .... ught, • an assertion which tl;l~'·discus~ibn 
. . . ·> .. ,, .. .. ~. 
' 
and third ·;_chapters w.i:J,f refute. · Vorstellung 
' I ' ~ \ • • 
. of our second 
. .. . ... ' . ' . . . . . 
necessar~ly~, . "by _ virtue of .its own nature, in 
. . . . ' . - . 
., . is completed~ 
• ' , t 
1thought aryp · not· the other way around. · At no time is Hegel 
' 
.., :J • ••• : ..... ' 
' . 'attempting to "tr~n"s'lab::i"· ·"vorstellun·g into thought. Such J 
9 \ . 
a. clairi\ '-ig~~r~s the·· dialectib~l · nature· of the. transition '. 
.. . . . 
. ·. . i . :. ' . - ' ; . ..: . . 
. In arri\~ing at ~~ell conclusions.,· Coples~on ,has ignorE!d ~ 
.. l ' ' .. 
.... Hegel 1 s c~ntention that the internal ·: transformation, the · · 
.. • ' ' . , \ >}' ' .... • ' ' "' I ' I 
. ,. . t. . . ~ ·'~ olio ' • • ~ 
· dialectic of Vo.rstellung, the relig"ious1,)standpoint, itself. 
' , .... 
... 
demands and ~r6vide~ the grotlrlds fdr ·-i -bs' ·pbii"os~phic or 
...... 
speculative comprehension •1 
. . 
This sam~ ~t~i~ude : is1 evid~nt 
II ~ • 1
1 
• • , • , • 
, ... · 
in Laue:r' s 'paper, which .we ~i~l examine next. · 
: (B) Lauer , .; 
.. 
•'. · ,\ r • 
Quenti.n L~uer 9~r_i~on_e:iusions 1~_imi11ar to · 
Coplestons ~ in a p·ap.~r e~titled, .. ·Hegel ' dn th~ · Identi,ty ·of · 
. . · ' ' . • . 17 
·content in Religion and Philosophy... . H.e beq.ins w~tp a historical · 
f 1 ' l . , . 
.. 
' '·' 
17 ;tn .Hegel and the Philosophy o f Re.ligion,, 
Christensen (The Hague: ·· Martinus Nijhof f, 
o" 
I • , . 
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. .. 








; • I I 
\ 
0 
survey and compares Kant • s alleged union ·of the content · 
o~ morality a~re1igion -~r Hegel:~ 'alleg~~ attempts ., 
to unit~ . . the content of religion and philosophy. ,. 'From ' 
• • • 0 • \ 
there h~moves . to a consi~~ration .of H~gel's ~i~cu~~ion 
~ of ·that s~bject. in th~ Phenomenology o-f Mind. 
· · He staies· that· in · this wo~~, Hegel, having 
, J .. 
abandoned his earlier Kantia_n, ant~::-C~r~stian, pro- · 
enlightenment 'thinking, att~mp:ts to synthesize C_llristi-
' . . 
~~ity with rati~nal t~ink~ng. 18 However, he states, 
Hegel's motive for inclu4ing the. subjec_t of religion 
·cwhich ~9th Fichte and Schell.i.ng' had left out : of their 
I 
. . 
systems) was not so -much to rescue religion as to rescue 
~ '- --- ' '· . " 
philosophy: ·"What.· motl_vates Hegel in his · insis~ence 
. . ;
"'that the ·content - of religion and science· (philosophy) 
is identical is not l)is desire -t'o rescue religion . 
. ,· 
Rather' ·it;.. is his desire· to rescue- philosophy, wh'i<;:h wquld. 
be less than universal ~cience if the 6bject of ·religion 
' . ·. . . - 19 
were out of its doma-in." . 
. . 
· · Lauer g-ives -h _is reader· the _ impres-sion (;for he 
does not state it directly) that Hegel is attempting some 
' . ~ 
' 1-8 . Ibi d., : p. 2(?4·; 
. , 
19 . 
. Ibid., - ~-· 265~-
. ·.· . 
. . ' 
- .. 
I 
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.. · . 
... , .. . 0 
', > . 
.Q .. = \"7' 
.•; . ·. ___ .. ~. 
form, of deduction, that he' ~s. attempting .to.'situate 
"' . 
, . 
• · · re.l1ig.i?~ in a pre-conceived plan in an arbitrary and 
~ ' . . . 
. 
contingent m~nner'. This is ce'rtainly . not- the case ,' 1 as 
we will. demon~trate later·. ' • .. 
_However, to continue with Lauer's argument, he 
. . . 
. 
asks what it can mean -to say that religion and philos~phy 
are two forms of spirit pos_sessing ~n identical content. 
• 




forms of consciousness into thou·ght, .. while in_ the case of 
. 
the reiigiou~~onsciou~ness the content~ i.e:, Wirklichkeit, 
,. . . .·. . 20 
· remains the same." But ag~in he does not so much engage 
' .· . . ({ . . ~-, ~ . 
in a genuine examination of the s.u.bject .. ~s voice. _pi~ . 
. J?u:z:zlemf.V}t as · to how it can be. the -cas,~~· _"I~. is unque·s.tionably 
• 
-,. 
· difficult to ~ee how the content _o~ phil~sophy ana ~eligipn 
. c~n. be identical. ••• Rey.,g~on as I such : has I never - ~ee~ ab.le 
. . . 21 . . . . . . 
to see the J.dentJ.tyt'" He~~ -~_rhaps· . ~-s a clue to Lauer's-ow~ 
- ~ j ~ 
. ' -
position for -he, _obviously, does "not see ·the: identity, either, 
lending support · to' the view that ·his whole examination ha~ 
, . 
.. o '. It!~ ' ".. o : • o 
.. . ', been fro~ the religious . poin:b.- of vi~w r?tther th~n that of 
philosophy_. If ~o, he coulq not. help be.ing unable to. see it •. 
• • 'I • • • • : ~ ' • 
/ '-· ... . . ' ·.· . 20 I 
. Ibid., p. 266 • . 
• 0 • , 
. 
21Ibid~, p. 268. • I . .. 
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That he is 
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out of s~mpathy ~it~_Hegei ~s 
• . surely obv'i.ous from his·. statements conce~ning He~Jel 's 
' l 
supposed ~lim · whi~h · .was to find a God compatible wi~h . 
modern reason and· thought. ·Lauer is the:;-eb~ implying 
' , 
that, after all, Hegel ia still clearly within th~ 
I . I . I 
enlightenment· tradition in his approach. Hegel, Lauer 
16 
. . 
.. claims, be.l,ieved he had found Him in the ·God of Christianity, 
but rathe~, had ins-tead e.ffec'ted a transformation. of · 
the Christ.ian religion· and a trartsformed · conc'ept of God~ 22 
. ' 
In this, Lauer voices his agreement with Fackenh~im whose 
. I . 
vi~w w~ will subsequently examine. Agaln we : find Hegel 
accused of arbitrarily re-'wbrking Christianity and the> 
' 
. . . 
Chr·istian God to his own ends; no effor~ has been mad~, 
' • 
• . 0 
to .comprehend _He9el',s · claim that · Christia'ni_ty~ th~ ·: 
_ab'solute religion, is ab~~lute -precisely bec~uf!e wl thi~ 
it, .on th~ plane· of histor~·,_ keli'gion has transformed . 
itself.· 
-- . 
We now come·- to Lauer's cionc+us.i.ons , · which -are 
even mcire unacceptable th~n his other cont'entions. withi!'l ... 
. . . 
the body of his paper. .He states ;-with ·regard to the 
I I ' . ~ . ' 
Lec£ures. that ·"the philosophy of ~eligion of ~hich Heg~1 _;. 
, ... -
,. 
,.:-· --~- speaks 
. --....; -
• ='" ·: J 
is not a. ph.li..los_ophizing about teligiqn; it ·is .. " 
.. 
. . · 
, 
2i · 
_Ibid., p. 270. 
· ; l 
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~ I 
. I 
o · ' " ' ' I t' 
. ~he th.inking· philosophical!,~ 'what religion th~,?ks_ 
. religiously.-... No · longer is there question m~rely of 
. ' 
an identical content in both relig~on and philosophy; 
' . 
~eligion itself is p~rfec~~~ in philosophy 1tn such a 
' • . I .. 
way that the two' are no long~r d:i~tinc't:; r'~iigi~n .1 is 
. .. . .... . ·~ ~ . . . . . . 
. \ I • 
riow philosophical religion, because it i~ complete-as · 
, ' . I 
religi~n in :the form of phi,losophy."" 23 / This H~~~s him 
finally . to claim that Hegel has achieved.a speculative 
tr·a~sformation of ·reveaie~. r~ligioh·.·~ 4 
· In answer to these last contentions of Lauer's 
¥e might quote James Doull whose ' remarks are addressed, 
. ' . ' 




conclusion must be alfogether r~jected: Hegel neithei:: · ~ 
. . (. ~ 
redu~es religion to philosophy ~or · does ' he undertake a 
• \ ' ' ' ) I 
, I 
'speculative transformation of reli9ioni (p. 274}~ Rather 
he ·distinguished religion·. and ,phi.losophy more clearly and 
. ~ . ' 
maintains their ·diff,eremce more firmly than any othe~ 
philosophy. · Philosophy_ of rei.igio.n ha$ for its purpose, · 
· in his view, no.t '. to 'replace. religion, ·but to· save· it f r o.m 
• I , . 
cqnfusion fro·rn otheli forrqs of spirit·:" 2 5 -" Doull further. 





- ~., p ; 273 •. ; 
·~ 4rbid!, > ' p. 274'. . 
2 SJ:bid., p. 279. From the ~oint . of . view _o f our own day· 
·we can clearly see how necessary this , is with the numerou~ 
.attempts to .reP,uce r eligion· to psych6.l;ogy, ·anthropology 
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1 • •• ·"' 
. _, 
.,. 
states tha_t phil?sophy neG:essarily requires the . 
s. . '. ";) 
18 
i~dependence of religion, a fact that Lauer himself' should 
' '. . 
have seen, given his frequent quotations regarding the 
~--.-~ 
.: I 'hi~-f~i:'ical priority of· ,relig.ion over pliilosophy. · Finally, 
'-;::~: ·' ·:· . . . . . ~ 
D<;;>ufHtat~s, "the indep~~dence~of ~eligion .f~pm.._ 
philosophy is established ne~~her empirically _nor on 
• , q, f 
· the basis of a particular philosophy - the· limits it I . . . I 
set to human reason - but from the nat_ui:'e of reas6fl 
. . 
an~ sp{ritl.as .disclosed -in religion ;itself-."~6 Our· 
I • ' - I I 
.. second ·and- third·· Chapte~s· are only ah el~boratiolf of this _ . 
. ·I I • • • - . \', 
. -.~ast statrment. . . ' 
(C) Fackknheim · 
/ r 
·, . 
. ~he question of the relation of ~eligion .and 
. ·philo~L~hY. rec~ives· itS most compreheils~~~ treatment in 
E.L. · Fackenheim's ~?r~, ~he Religious Di~erision in Hegel's 
.· 2 7 • , I • ... \ 
Thought·. \ 
/· i 
The theme of'.th-is wo~k, .as 1a whole \is "the relation 
\... I' . 
)?etween the religious life · ~hich is t? be 'fomp~ehend~d _ _ ·. 
··-· 
. ,. 
· and , the. comprehending acti iri ty whicii is He\ E!l • s . philosophy , • :. :• 2 8 
.
· . . · ~ A. 
·· ·'. I ~ . v 
2 6Ibid., 'p. 279. 
--. • 
. . 
~ . .. 
2 7Bloomi.ngton: .. Indi an'a Univ~rsi.!:.y . J?'res s , .~967. 
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.. \ ·· 
However, Fackenheim claims·, · Hegel is n~~~ s~irnply conce~ried 
. .. 
··. 
with the philosop~iC?.~~ cornprehensio11 of religion ,but 
-- ... - - ~-
rathe.:f consl.ders his. syst~ .to · be entirely Tontin.gent. 
·· on the success · ~£ this corn~rehension. 29' It is perh~ps 
4 
·not too much to say ·that· Fackenheim i~ making this 
~ 
larger. 9laim has before h~rn the attempts.o£ Fichte 
0 !! • ' . . 
and Sch~lling, which we;e much critlcized by Hege~·, to 
formulate' absolute philosophical systems while leavin_g 
. . . . ! 
out · religion . . In one se11.s~,-...then, Fackenl1eirn is only • 
.. 
. ·: · cla~ming what· mul;;t . have been . obvibus to Hegel · hirn_self. · 
~s welii however, he will ultimately crit~ciz~ Hegel 
. -::-.. 
for the same repsons for which the latter criticized 
his two contE;!mporar.ies. This re·qui.res ·him to interpret 
' ... . · - ' 
This he does, be~inning with·the~Phenomenology 
and proceeding to the Encyclopaedia. On the basis of 
his examination Of these two 1 attempts; 1t0 estab~ish .an· · 
· absolute system F_acke,nhe.~rn ~qnc~~e~ that on . ~heir .• ~wn 
·they have not been a su.ccess: Hegel' can achieve the 
. . . ~ . .. 
I"' 
a:b·solute standpoin·t within the Phenomenology only. by 
. t·· .. 
... 
' . 0~ 
'! 4[%: ~ 
.. baying .. alrea.~y adop.ted it in so~~ a priori ~~.1sh;ipn ~ 30 · -.:' ' 
·, 





.,. • ' • 1 ' , 
'
2 9wh'l . ' 'd ' k h ' i k . 
. . 1. e we are not ·l.ntereste '.l.I"f Fac en e1.rn s wor as· 
a who,le we must, · for· our .. o~n purposes, considt:;J::; i,ts , ' 
: J?r·i~cip.al themes -t:o .some extent~ · 
. • . I . . . • . 
30 
. k . . ' h . 1 11 
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,; The Encyclopa~dia, in turd~ .~an only~ be .a ·' thought ·whic~ · 
·, . ~ 
encomp~s~es the wor~d "·•. on the assumption ·that it has 
' ' • • f') • .. • " ' ~-- ' • 
' II 31 d b• • ~ • o overreach1.ng power , an not_. on _t}le . _as1.s q:r 1. ts 
demonstration in that work . . Hegel's sy~tem, is 
· fundamentally incomplete, Fac~enheim claims, and can 
o~ly be co~pleted ~-f he is success~u~ . in gi~in~ · 
' . ' . 
Christianity its . absplu~ely final fo~m.in . his .Lectures 
0 
on . the .@ilosophy of Religion·, . . to whi~h he therefore 
turns. 1• It is not our intent io~ to ~xam±ne this 
.contention: na~ely, .' that\ ~he . Le~t~res ,Je the cornerStone"· 
of the ent1.re · Hegel1.an phJ.losophy. \ .: . · 
I' 
However, the turn ·to the Lectures" brings us 
• 
' . ~ () 
·.much closer ·to. pur own theme. · It was J(lec~s.Sary to have 
• • • ~ . I 
begu'rt as we did,· for only ·having _ done so ·lwould we be •in'. 
' . ~-
a positiqn .to underst~nd . the rema~nder . o~ · Facken~eimis 
• " I I 
argum~t, particularly ·hj,.s co~chisions regarding the .· · ·.: 
. . . . .( \ 
.A 
" 
relation of religion and phi~osophy. Fackenheim ·quot~s 
, . 
.'1 . . . 











But philosophy cannot ex~st without religion/ For it . 
. . · .. 
· ,• .1' • . 113 2 
. encompasses re 1.g1.on. 
\. 
. 
3 1Ibid'.', 1"· 112 ~ 
.. 
... 32 b 'd. . . . 116 
.:!._2._. , · P~ • 
,. . 
The r'e st of his work is · con.cerned 
" 
' .... . ·. ,· 
. . 
.-t:.,, 
• . I 
\ 
I I 
• • Cl ~ 
' . 1-- . 
' . .. 






. .. ... ~ 
' . 
" . 
. · ' 
; . 
~ - .. 
• 1, ? 
' \ 
./ 
































sol~ly with e~aminiri~ these state~ehts. 
• 0~ ciaizri'~~g th.at t,he Chr~stian) . r~lfgi()n is pre~upposed 
by., Hegel•' s philosophy, Fackenh~im p~oceeds to "·des crib~" 3 3 
. . , · n . 
• c ~ ' 
Christi·anity from an u:Aphi·losopliically comp~~hended ·point 
• . .I ~ • • . • ~ 
' • ' 
,of view, which he claims Hegel never · ~ttempt·ed·. 
~ ' ' • " • 0 
But in· 
doing 'so, Fackenh~im seem~ to ignore Hegel's claim. that 
\tbe trans'formation '~f Chri~tianit~~. does not occur within 
' v . ·' " 
!his phiiosoph~ 'so much as within Christianity ·itself. It 
• •-l' e .. . , . . . . 
.. 
the absolute religibn, 
.·r . 
is the n·ature of christianity/, as 
. . . \ .  
t6e~r~li~ion within whic~ God ·has revealed himself to· 
, r 
0 • J • 
man ~n Christ and ~~ere~y ,ove~come the.divine-h~man · · 
~ . ' . . . 
,. ,. 
separation, to a~h~eve the liberation ·of r~ligiori from 
• 
\ i ts~lf, wh~ch it has be.e.n the aim of the w~ole his. tory -
.. \ ·' . . . . 
of religion' to achiev:e •· 0 
as we, 
.' Unfqr:t~at~ly thi~~ le~d-~ us to say of Fa·c~~nheim,. 
hav.e 'already said of Co~;-~stoh an.¢1 La}ler, ·.. . 
I' 
that he a@proa~hes the qu~stion, not philoso~hically, 
' . 0 





tr'"'ue nature of '·the relation · eludes hi'm, Fackenheim accuses 
u • • I . f:l· ., ~ 
. Chrij~~an theologians of ~ever b?ving taken the . Lectures :· 
seriou~ly. 3 4 Urifor1T_unat~ly we must ·conclude ~he same of ·h~rn . 
• .., t' 
0 
\ ·.. .. 
~ : . 
. ~33 rbi<;l·.", p . . 116. 
,' 
·:c . I 
34 Ib ~_·d. , 119 ~ p. ;. . • 
·" 
.,. 
) . - ' 













., 22 . . 
Fackenheim's procedure i;'. 
' , 
· ' e1.aporatin·g · the ·same que~tion 
is· . one :of,, co,nStat· ~Y­
civer .and over ag in .. His · ... 
• • • • • • -. b • 
. . refonnula-~ion,· folio.wing his' examination of "unphilo-
sophi.call.y ~omprehe~ded' religio.n" is the mos-t s-ignificant 
for us: 
- I 
Either the representational form of relig~on is-
essential to its content·, and this is wHy .philosophy ·· 
. req~ir7s reli~:i'?ri (and the ~bsolute philos~p~y the . 
C}¥"1st1a.n rel1g1on·) as, necessary .Presuppos1t1on •. . 
But then how can 'philo.sophy transc~nd or _ transfigtJre 
the representational form without loss of the . 
,religious content? Or ~lse philosop~y does· inde~~ 
achieve its unprecedented_ feat: · but · then was not · .· . 
. the :representatidnal for~all ~long uness~ntial to 
:the religious yonte~t?, ]\nd does it not -the'n 35 
presuppose religion_, if at all, only per accidens~ . · 
.7 
. ' 
One must hesitate ·before accusing a ' scholar of 
Fackenheirn' s reputatio~ ·of ·_ignoring the ~iatectic_ of . 
th~ religiou_s sta-ndpoint, - but one cannot hel~ but ,conclude 
• • • ' _ 4 / n 
11
_ 
~hat on examining the Lectures, he has done just·· th_a:t:. 
How else could ' he speak .of _philosophy · t ·ranscending or 
. - . . . I 
·t:-r?-nsfigu,~in~ r 'eligion? It is the v~ry task i. ot' tlie -.,. 
- . 
Lectai:'es to derno'nstrate · that ' it is religi9n i tself,., and 
- ·.{ llr . , 
not ph.j.losophy which pre_cipitat_e ·s · _the tran~formation or 
transfiguration. The rel,ation is not ext·ernal or 
conti~gent· on any 'particular · philos~phy which- s eeks to 





- Ibid., p ·. 162. 
~ 
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comprehend it, but rathe_r emerges _of necessity out· of 
. . 
the· nature of religion i_tself ~ Religion and philosophy 
., . 
. .. , -
are related by an internal dialectic which it is the task 
. 
of "the Lectuz;-es to reveal·. ·The fact .that Fackenheim 
-
- .. 
,, .. · 
23 
. , . seems to be unaware of this s,i~gulaily im,Portant point 








demonstrates that his examination of that relation has 
. . Q -
been carried; out ~ntirely. from the ~tan'dpoint of religion .-
rather thar:t of ·· philos<;>phy .• 
,, 
Fackenheim is led, finally, to set_ do~n,~~s ~he 
.. 
absolute ··re·qu.irement for the succes;3 o~ philosophy, that 
~t1 be based on -" .•. an actual, and, i~ prin6ipl~, final 
' . . . . . ' ,.3 6 . 
s~cular-protestant synthesis in modern l1fe.... only 
., .. 
then "can Hegel bot-h veri'ture . that final · syhthesis whic;h "-r 
.,- - . 
is his philosop,ic thought and. yet : !fla.intain that it will 
' lj -
not end .. the ' life· which has made Lt pGssibl~-. "37· . 
I • • / 
. . 
Nothing cduld be .more contra~y to _He gel's intentions.· 
· ·Fac~enh~im attributes this bourgeois-protestant · synthesis 
. ' . . . 
. ·('' ,, 
to Hegel's _nineteenth century world and claims t:hat such · · : 
I~. • ' ' ''· 
a synthesis has long since ?roken do~ - as witnessed by 
the -barbarisms of Nazi Ge~man~~ in particular~ Rather it 
. . 
is th~ case that Hegel is directly oppose? to just such i 
/' 
36~. , 

































a synthesis, which he attribute_s, not to qis century, 
· but to the s ·e .cularizlng rationalism of the enlightenment 
and towards which he is in complete opposi tiori, a·s even 
. ' . 
a cursory ~xamination of the Lec-tures will demonstrate ... 
.. , ., 
.We must concl~de ·. th~t _Fackenheim, too, has missed 
• ,, ' I I , ' , • 
the point. He .has fail~d t91 r~alize t:hat, for ~egel ~ 
religion and philosophy are internally linked such 
0 . , 
that philosophy emerges not ~s triumphant over r ·eligion 
0 
24 
but as the triumph of the · inner transformati-on of religion 
. . ' 
itself. Religion's transition to philosophy is due to · 
the fqlfillment of its own e~sential nature and ·not the 
result of an arbitrary. attempt on the par-t;: of philosophy 
'.to· ill)pose a ~ystem upon it. 
• 
While these three r~pi:e,pentati ve approaches are 
by no means . 'exhaustive they are typical. and have in 
·· common the. failure' t~ take seriously the dialectical 
. . . I . 
'I 
. 
int_errelati~n Hegel ascribys to religion and philo,sophy. 
. . 
It is the nature of this di~lectical relation which we 
'must. ~ow. turn to consider. 
'• 
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· CHAPTER II 




In this chapter we shall. examine the nature of 
. ) 
1
'Vod:;_tellung I 1 'Or 1 ~ental representation aS a I faCUlty,,' 
, . 
of m1nd and the role played by it in the . overall 
., 
dev~lopmen~ of mind • . We · hope . by this exaini.natipn to 
clarify the . relation between 'Vorstellung' and thinking, 
as an aid -ultimately towards the clarification of .the 
.. ~ --------, 
. '· 
. relation of religion ·and philosophy · for Hegel. To 
. \ . 
co~prehend the nature of tVorstellung .properly it is 
·first necessary to know . what mind ~s for H~gel. 
· Accor~ii~g to Hegel the need to achieve .tru'e 
knowledge· of mind is the meaning of the Delphic oracle: . 
~ : ~ 
. ' ·"kno~ thysel.f. '' L He states .that this is n~t an '· ex~e:r;nally .. 
imposed command; nor doesl it advocat_e · a purely subjec_tive 
' kind. of knowledge .. \ Instead, the command to "know thyself" 
is ·a .· cormnand of mind to i ·tself: 
I 
.. 
that_it come to a 
knowledge of itsel·f and thereby realize ;its : nature. Such 
... 1 
. j 
1Hegel' s Philosophy·· of mind ·, 
Wallace and A.V. Miller (O~ford: 
-1971)· , . ·ss. 377,. Herea.fter PM. 
'J 
. , . 
, . . 
translateq by William 
The· Clarendon Press, 
·.· 
. I . 
·.· 
. - I . 
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·a command does not rnean~that ' we examine our . own 'mind or 
that 'of other indivi'duals. This· type of exami'n.ation 
. . 
caul~. 6~~y yield ~ conting~nt ana purely ~~bject~v~ ki~d 
of'knowledge. Instead we must attain knowledge of tne 
\) • 0 ' 
concept or No£ion (Begri{f) "of mind • 
.. 
, Mind is the process or activity of apprehendin~ 
I . I I . 
th'e process whereby. reality achieves sE!lf-
. 
~onsciousness. ·p~r Hegel, reality is the . Idea and mind 
" is the " ... most developed form 'achieved by the Idea in • · 
,, . . . . . . . . a 
its self-actualizat~on." However' mind d9es·· n~t · emerge · · ,., 
I j l u 
, . ~ . . ' 
or ~~i~t full-blownt immediately; rather it arises -in a 
' 6.1 • .. ... • 
process : of development, which,- Hegel claims, occurs 
diale_c~ically. He i,compares it to the growth of the 
· bio~ogical organism: "Just as in the living organism~ 
"' 





" manne.r, in. the ·ger~ a~d is ?rought forth oy the g~rm 
itself, not by an alien power, so too must all the forms 
, . 
of living mind grow out . of its· Notion · as from · their 
• II 3 • d h . d f ' th d ge~m. . . M~n , t eq., un e~goes, a process o grow an 
matur.ation analogous to that· of the nat~ral ·organism. 
And j.ust as the.· organism g_rows ·until it ·reaches ·maturity, : 
- I t { 
· ' 
or ~ealizes its potential for development, so a~ _ the 
limits of m'ind' _s ~evyopmei:l:t . se~ by· itself: - Mind , c;:mly 
~ 
2PM, · ss ' 377. 
·_jPM, ss 379 •. 
, .. 













develops to the liroit ·set by its own essence; to the point 
1 at which it i ,s comJ?l~tely conscious of its own true self~ 
Howeyer I , there i"s nothing natural about mind' 5 
existence. On the contrary mind develops ·by. reducing 
·.the n 'atural to an idea:l or inward" state or by trans-
. forming it .into the mental or spiritual. 4 Hegel .claims 
that "every activity of mind 'is nothing but a distinct . 
~ • • 0 • 
I ' ·,· 
·mode {or fo~m) .of reducing what:. is ext·e ·rnal to the 
' . -. inw~rdness -which mind itself is, and · i't~ 'i~ - ' only by 
. . ' . \ . 
thi~ reduction, by : this ideaiization, of\ what fs exter~al 
· that. it be9ome.s ~~d is · mind. :,S Mind de~~ps a~ .the . . . 
exp~nse of . .t;he non.-rn~mt"!-~nd this realization constitutes 
its triu!llph over it: " .... · it is. through the· other · and 
27 
by the triumph o.Jer it,. that mind comes t.o authenticate'"~ \\ 
itself and to be in.fact what it. ought to _ be according 
.I 
. to its Notion, namely the idt:!lality of t~e external, the 
~ . . 
· Idea which returns to itself out of its otherness; o~ 
expressed rnore . ·abs~ractly, the se~f-different!ating 
uriivers.al which in its di.fferenceAis at home with . itse·l~ 
and for itself." 6 • 
The activity· of idealization and that of rnanifes-
tation are one and ,the same.. ·According · to- Hegel, "th~ 
4The German \~ord Geist carries the meaning ,Qf bath . 
- - English terms. . · · 1 
5PM, ss 380. 
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special mod~ of ·mental being is manifestation. .. ; The sp1r~t 
(or ~ind) is not some o~e 'mode or -~ meani~g which finds 
utterance and externality only in a form dis~inct from 
I ~ 
it does not manifest or reveal something but 
its yery mode and meaning is th)..s I,"evelation. " 7 . Mind 
... 
does not reveal that some other 'thing' is the nature 
. , 
_.of reality .b~t ~hat ~t its~lf is ·that true natu;re. 
Mind reveals that it is the Idea and it is the whole I . 
goal of tHe natural and spiritual worlds to make this 
. . 
'truth' explicit or ·~ctual;·-· ·Put ~nothe~ w~y- the form which 
' • • • • • .... • ... ' ..... : 1 -
mind 1_g_iyes its · c~ntent cannot be ~·se-para'ted _ fro~ the ., 
., 
co-ntent . . Tl+~ - content and the v'arious modes ·-of its 
. ' 
manifestc;tion ar~ one ·and the ·same •. · Fo; · · thi~ reason . 
• I .,. • , 
./J I , . ,: . 
mind is the unity of. .form and contept; subject ?nd, object. 
\ • • • , I 
' . 
Hegel · states: · "The manifestatiqp ot itself to · itself is 
, . 
therefore itself the ·1c6ntent of mind and not- as it were, 
. 
a form externally added to the cont~nt: consequently . 
mind, by its· manifesta4ion, does not manifest a · COQtent 
I • - · 
different frofl i ·ts form~ but ··_ rnanifests · its~ for~- ·whi~h . ·· . 
.. expresses the e~tire son tent of :mind, n~mely its s~lf-
. \ 
. . . . 
28 
'1 • 
manifestation·. .~n mind therefor~' - f9rm and. 'content a -re -- · · .. · ·· 
o ••o • - ' T - • • -
. .· '8 
identical with each. other·." 
I • ' ' ·• ' ' 
We have stated ·in outline the essential na~ure -of 
' ' 
mind; ·. The . ·concrete realization of th·j_~ es_sential/ nature,, --· 
., 
• ' j • • I 
.. ,. 
7~~ ss 383. 
''::. 
8PM, ss 383. -··, .-
··. 
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or as H~g~l. r~jers to _i;t, the form~ of absolute mind .-
• ,I 
are art, religion and philosophy, espe_cially philo~bphy .. 
. . . 
I . 
He c~aims . t_h~t the -a~t~vity of p{lilosc;>J?hi:zing . (i.e·. 
I ·reasoning) is that. in which mind is fully· self-·cons·cious. 
- . I . 
·' and- self-constitutive, - f'u-lly at 'nome with itse 1 f. 
Philosophy, in his t'erms, is th~ 'actuafi·z~d not,i'on. 
' . 
. Accordingly, Hegel states, ."Absolute: mind ·knows that it 
~posit$ itself, that it_ is .. itself ' tl)e creator of its _other, 
' .~ . ~ ... .... 
. '...of · Nature ~nd finite .mind, so -tha-t;. this1-Qther l~s-es · all 
I - 1 
· semblance of ~ndependence in face pf mind~ aDd · appears 
only as · a means- where~y ~inCl attains to absolute be~ng- . 
' for-self,· to the absoJ..u·te unitY of. what it i? in itE?el.f ' . 
anQ. what it .. is ~or it~elf, of its NotiO'n . ·a~i~ts . actuality. "g 
. ' 
.. 
I ' 0 
'(To be absolute is · th'l\S the goal of mind; a . goal which ·. when 
I ' • ~ • 
I , attained constitute~ the unity of ,_ mi~d! s potential and : ( ; ., 
actual existences; a goal ih" whic_h all its various oth'er-
1 I • v - ·~ 
forms and manifestations have been a.lds · 
• 4 
i ·n reaching 
and which· are subsumed as moments· or element.§. i.~ thi~·. • 
. ~ ·' 
new to.tali ty. 
Absolu~e· mind, as we stated earli~r, is . th;e end 
. . . I 
or result of a process of ·development which · occurs · · ·. 
~·· • • .. .J, 
. - . 
dialectically, or stated differently . wh:!:ch is guided by 
. • I 
. . 9 . ' - ... I . 
- , .: · . __ ~, -·PM, · ss: 384 ·z usatz •. 
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I • I 
the end tq ·be achieved .. I Hegel distinguishes two main 
forms which ar~ dialectically prior to Absolute mind·: 
o I 
.. subjective mind and objective mind. Mure states the 
•• 
nature of this interrelation very lucidly: According 
1 ' 
'· 
to h·im, mind is a "single self-reconstitutive activity. 
q, ~· 
In every phase of its whole dialectic - in· its emergence 
' from nature as Subj~~v~ .s.pirit·; -in· its tr~nsition to 




· .. . 
completion through. the sta'ges · of Absol¥te · Spirit - . it is 
a concrete attitude of subject to object. In · any one• 
. I . ' I 
giv!fn phase of it the. proximate lower phase .as ~ totality • 
.. .. ( ~ 
. has been subrated ('!ufgehoben) to become the· obje-ct .or 
content of .the subject, ·which has· thereby come to exhibit 
- ' ' 
~ fr~sh atti~ude to a~ object which is also fresh~ · but 
fresh only in. the sense ' that ic ' is the su}?jec~' s whole 
self of the · previou~ phase ·developed by.be~oming · o~j~ct 
. 10 ~· or contcdnt." The dialectic of mind or spirit mov:e.~ 
from -lesser to gr'¥at.er mentali~y or SJ?iritualit;y as a 
' result of a series of internal developments within each 
. ' 
phase .which U:r:tdermine it and ultimat_:ly caps_e . i~ to_ 
.. 
revolt against itself thereby producing'a · new' status .quo • 
. · . . . 
. .. 
' _//' . . I 
I , 
10 . ;, . . 
. ' G.R.,M·. Mure, A Study ·of: Hegel's Logic· (Oxfbrd: .The 
















' According to Mure spirit or mind "is in ~ach,successive 
phase more real,, more _truly possessed of the nature which 
0 ' • 
. it claims for :itselr or, in phases which are ,not · expl;icitly 
·' I \ ' 11 
selt-conscious, lfo~ its object." We· ar'e interested . in · 
only one aspect of. this dialectical mo,vementl: the · ul, timate 
form· achieved by subjective mind - the ~evelopment of the 
"mental faculties," the subject-matter of psychology. 
, (2) The. Nature of· Psychology in general' 
P_sychology conceives of mind 'only- formally 7 as 
power. 
I . : · 
It distinguishes two types of power: that of · 
~ 
., 
cognizing, the _power. of intelliger;ce; and that of willing. \. 
1 • - t - ' . 
Taken as a functioning whJle they become what Hegel calls 
I 
"free mind," As free mind they constitute a fully 
developed subjectivity or mentality and. as' . suc'h throw off 
• ' • D, • 
· their simply formal character and begin · to ·function 
concrete.l,y as law-givers and creators of systems or codes 
I • 
of morality. Free mind c .onstitutes. ·the limit or. the end 
the form of mind ~ied by psy~hology. 




cognizing and ~ill·ing - lies in the dialectical negation 
of the ·(logically) prio_r form of subj _ective mind: I 
consciousness. The goal of 'subjective mind as a whole, 
\ 
I ' • 



















. . . 
as its name implies, is to manifest' itself as a true 
I 
J \!!> 
subjectivity, to become- a ·fully. constituted anq active 
. . \ . 
. inwardness, or, to become mind. 
.. . . . . 
The . S1elf-neg~ti?n o~ .tl:J.e form ·of consciousness 
occurs as a re~ult · of its re6o~nition of its inability 
.to achieve this end. Consciousness is neces~arily a 
.. 
relation . ot'. subject and- ·object, . or, of the ego to a 
non ego. However, in consciousn~ss .-real subjectivity 
" 
I ' . 
. still does not exist: it is still an abstraction. 
Consciousness fails to recognize that its object, which · 
.. . 






, : previously constituted the· spii'i t?al ·form of ·sol}~, · actually 
is spiritual and treats it instead as an external object 
!' . " . 
_existing independently-of it."12_ Consciou~ness fail~ to 
recognize that it · iEj the power 9ver its_ c;>?ject and this : . . 
latter feature",- Hegel ~.states~ constitut~s · the major 
-distinction between it and the form of "fre~ mind"-. 
I • • 
Accordias to Hegel, whereas ·for consciousness "the 
I • o J .. 
prbgr~ssiv'e determination of the I I I assumes tl1e . appearance 
.. 
pf . an al't~ration of j:he objectc"_independe.~tly of the' 
'· . .. . . 
ac~ivity ·6f1 the I I I so. that at' the level ~f . consciousn~ss 
• • o - . . • . I . , . 
the logic.al~ consideration I of the alterati'on fell only 
~ 10 • • ' 
.... ·' " 
- . 
iri 0 • us: for · ,free mind, the self- ·develop'ing and· .. altering 
I • ' • . ' .. • 
I ~ 
.. 
· . . 
... .. ·. : 
. \_ . . . . ,.. , 
.. 
' . 12 . - . ·: .... . l .. 
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.l.': . 
of the defEirminatio~s of the object are·;'explicitiy the-
.,· .... \ . .. . 
prodtict of free mind ·itself, . 'th€ silbj ect~fy_ing of · 
• ~ t ~ . 
' ' o ' I ' • ' 
objectivity and the o~jectifying· of subjectivity a·~e-
. I • 
·. • ' 13 ' . ' ~ts own work." - . . The development 'and sophis-t;.ic.ation .of · 
• l.l> ~ I 
this subjectivity, o£ the m~~tal faculties - in 
' to • . .. 
particular the ~ev_elopment of ·the ,faculty of Vorstellung _:- .·.· 
· ·· ·· · 'v4 - · 
will occupy our attention ~~ir,, the. re~~ of the ch_apt7r. . 
, l • . : j" . • 
We have already partly charact~rized -the general -
. 
• • 0 .. 
nature of our subject, the manifestation of the · intellect . . 
' ' I ' I .: .. 
The ' go'al of this manifestation _·is · to transfer~ the • given' 
. . . . . . , . " . .. ·. ' . . · . 
, ' , • I , •• l 
of consciousness into.~ the intelligible and, c_ons'equent 
. . . .. 
.. 
' •• 0 
.... ... 
· · on this activity, to · xh~ke the intel.lect objective, -6r, .. 
: to provide it with an act1,1al. existence. At first., mind_ 
'is unaware of the inh~ren~ rationality of its ' object. 




. ' ' 
· intrinslca~ly 1 rational ob·/~ct' from trye · fo_:rm of c~~.tingen~;··,_ 
I .. - I 
. singleness and exfernality which at first clings to it' 
' I . 
: ln9. . ~h~~reb~ ·free lts~if .1"ftoni the . co~nection whlqh' -is for 
. ·- ~ 
. .: . 15 . / .. : . - . • . .. 
it an Other .. " The development of ·intell;igepce~ o.z;-, ... 
' ' n • • • - / ' ' ' • • • I ""• 
theoreti~·al 'mind, through . i ~s manifestations as th~ . " 
. - ' . \ . . . . . . . ' · . ' 
faculti~s o.f; -intuiti'op, Vorsjtellung and reason ·is thi~· : . 
~ . . 




-: -. ·. \ ... - . . _· process. 1 It is ·a -,dev~lopm~n~ -- ~r.<?.~\ P~.s~-~v~ty' to ~c·t~~itr~ 
' ' I ' " II . I 
.. ~ . . :. , . 
· · ~-g . 
·:.:. • ' 
' 
. I 
13 . . ' . . ': ... . . ' 
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14 . . 
· We are 
. ~ . .. . · . . - . , : . ~ . 
: , of free mind 
only i..n terest.ec;l 'in the intell~'!=t·ual _ side . . 
and wi?-1 . di~.regard ·the · development -of will.. 
. ' ' 
15 ,. 6 PM, ss 441· Zusatz ~ , _ 1'(. ' , • 
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• ~ 0 ... . ' 
. { 
from simply '.'fin.ding" l.~s obj~c~ i~ ~ntuitiop to the~· · . 
ordering a ·nd compr~hension · of it -in teason. Accordil)g 
• ' I • • r') 
. . . 
t~ Hegel " theQretical "mind~ is_ hot. a merely passive 
3.4" 
.. 
:. ·· acceptance of an Oth'er, of ~ - given ' object, but reveal 's 
I r . 
tf 




.~· ~"·· · · · ~t! ..  ·. . J : 
.. "' . 
. ~ . . 
.. ... . ·., . ' : . : ·. :· 
• I • " 
. . 
~ itself. as active by raising the inherently rational. · 
~ ' 
content of the object _o_ut' 0~ the f~.rm o'f ~xternality and 
I . . 16 ' . . ' 
!3Ingleness into the fori!t of Reason.'.' : Intuition, 
Vor~t~llung and reason. are united·~nd inter-dependent 
e~forts toward a rn~e compiet~ _ ~~ogn~ tip~ or · k~ow~.e~~e 




:' ~·ather ·"... exist only as ~~oment.s 1 in ,the· totality .of 
. 17' ·, . 
· cognition itself .• " ··T.tle 
. . . 
·-fir~t iin· t~e ~e~se of 
• ' . "-',y 
dialectically 
. . - ,.., 
first) ·.or rno~t primttiv'e ·of .·th~·se· .faculties 
.,. 
1 
I n I 
is intuition.· 
' ·' 
.•. • . ' • • , . • ~ t . \ . ., . • •• ·o 
,: \ L.ike 'l·co~sc;iousne~s·, int~i ~~on . .' find.s 1 · i tsel.f · 
' 
confronted- by · an object. Howe-v~r , it. marks an· advanc~ ." o 
. ' ~ . . . \ 
.~ ;n. th~ . former .·in· that it gai~s ~n intimation, a· .bare · . ·. ·. 
... . . ' . . ' . . ' 
feeling, th'a.; its .objec~ is· .inherently 'r~tion~l' 'or' no.t .' 
~. 
· truly an Other. . Mu~e :t:'efers to. this· il).'!:irnati<;m" as the . : 
q ' . ,Jt • 18 . ' ' pi · . . 
· "pr~mitiv~ univet~41." ·This "intifuation or manife~t~~ion · 
............ ·'' 
16PM,. ss. 444 ~usatz. 
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, ·• e 
·· of the primitive ~n~yersal .op;,oP,e·l~ ,intui~io~ 'o.I)w4rd .fro{Il 
' .· 











• • • f t • • 
., 
• ~ • • J 
its : ~xist~nc~ · as ~imply feeling to .fu~ther fix oi at~end 
". £., I.,., . ·, •. 
to . its . ol:)j·ecb. 
,0 ' c 
' · .. 




' of f~eliqi ~~q of furiher recogn~zing is as intelligible 
• I : D • \ • 
while maintaining it as an Other. Attention, then, . is a 
I ; • • ' ') 
·t·'\. > ,.,;.) ':/ .. ' 
-¢.~1. 
••• <I • •• f'l 'c: 













• .. # • 9 . . 
·oproduc~s to'. begi-n with simply.' a . shift.:\,ng of sensation 
• 0 ~ • • ' • • 
• ··~wuy from US 1 a .trelflSforrnatiOn° Of Wha·t iS Sensed in1;:0 an 
> ~:qj.~ct;c ~xi~{jng outside of us." 19 ·"sensations are made 
spa·~ial · · an<~. t~mporal 'by the · act,i vi ty •bf • intu~·tion · an·d : 
. . 
this ·,constitutes the. first· form 'of universality ,achieyed 
. ... . ~· . . 
The· .orde.r:ing. of its object · is ."essen'tial 
t' 




to mind 'for 'unless it i s capable of distinguishinc:f one: 1.1 
oo;1 
• • I \ o o 
"from.· anothe r it .' ~·s unable to· "C::.omprehend it.. This ove<rall 
aptiv~ty of diq~ingui~~ing and or~ering £Onsfitute~ the 
• '' 
positive ach{evement .of · inte'!l.i:gence in , its mani f estation 
. . ~ ·... . . . ' . . .. 
as ' intuitionr-~Its dialecti cal" self-negation occu~s 
as fo~lows,· .giving· ri.se t6 the 'fa culty' . ~'of Vorstellung. 
~~tui tio~ afo14 Vo~.stellung are · alike in that 11 in ·) 
both forms 9f mind the Q~j ~?Ct , i~ separate f r om. me.· fin~. ~·t 
,. 
.' 
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• D.,. • 
. . .. ;, o ·'differemc~) the obje~t's 'characte'r of being mine is only 
,; 
implicitly present in in;tuition and _ fir~t _ bec.om~s e-xp-licit -. 
in representation (Vorst:ellung)· . In i¥ltuition the , 
. . 
objectivity of the content predominates. \ Not until it 
is r~wh~_ ref.lecl: · ;.hat it is ,:\ ~ho have_ the intuitio~~ - ' , 
-not until then d~ ·I occulfX the standpd'i1_1t _of representati6n 
' ' .' 2:0 '· · ~ . .; _· ' (Vorsteilung) . " _. · · t:.ntui ti_on, _therefore, must neces~arily · 
. . ' ' 
negate itself: " ... · the · nec~ssity ,;for ·'going beyond mere 
·.intuition, lies 'in.- the fact that intelligence, according, 
I • ' .. o I 
' 
to its Notion · (i.e. i _ts true nature), is cognition ' (the 
J I • • • 
activity of knowing), whereas intuition · is not· as yet . 
. . .} 
~ognitiv~ awareness of the subject-matter since as such • 
. . . 
. , . 
. it . does not a.ttain to the- immanent . development of the . 
• . 
. substance. of t _he s,ubject>-matter but confines itself 
. ! 
· · rather· to seiz.ing ·the une xplicated 's~bstance s ,tili w.r:'app,ed 
u~ in ' the ine~sentials of the ' ext~rnal and contingent. 
Intuition· is therefore only the beginning ·of cogni tio~. !• 21 
.. . ' ~ ' 
' • ' 
.; ·· 
•I 
for thi~ _ reason· is .intelligence d~fined as the "self-exi~tent 
dial~ctic" which actively "p~sit:s .intuition as ita own, 
pervades it,~akes 'i t . into s~meth~ng inward, recollects 




I ' . ' 
" 
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t ·. 
a.r51 hence ·free._ : ·ay this withdrawal into itself 
., ., 
·i · ' intelligence raises ~tself to the st_ag~ of mental 
) • : ' If • o 
. . 22 
.representation (Vorstellung) • " ; 
,. ' 
(3r The 'faculty' of Vorstell~n~· 
b 
In ~ntuition mind simply finds itself possessing 
. . ~ 
---- 2 3 . . . 
a content which~ in Vorstellung it proceeds . t~ inwarqize . . 
The Vor.st'ellung ~Gr idea · is an inwardized intuition. 
Vorstellung can be sub-divided · into .three phases of 
activity . . The first is that .of inward.izing or. recolle~·t1ng 
. . 
(Die· Errineruhg). The recollected image is further 
'• I 
liberated from its e-xternal. ·features and · ' rel-pr~sented' 
by a symPol or sign. This is i~agination t(Die · 
·•J . • • • 
., . 
-Einbildungscraft). Memory _, : in turn ·," is the activity 
• t , ' • I . , 
·. . . ~ . .. ' . . 24 
in which s1gns as words are once more recollected. _ · 




_22PM, ss ,~450 Zusatz-.· .d 
23 ., . . ·. . . 
. This is -a difficult word to translate: Findlay 
calis it "pic~ure-thought": Mure, "present~tion": and 
Miller translates it as "representation". ·'The German 
me~ning is that of the mind re-presenting its object out 
of i 'tself · and hence Miller's is perhaps ·the closest. ·. 
I t is alsq important -' to note that Vorstellung refers to : 
· a mental "faculty" . . : If we wish to express the active 
.t nature . of this faculty · we use Vorstellen ·-- t~e ·activity 
of·· ~e-presenting. Vorstellung· also has the coimotation 
of a'product ~ wh~t is produced ·by the activity of · 
. Vorstellen, or by . the faculty of vorstellung~ its 
· "~bject", _as it were. · · 1 








•• \ l .. 
syste~atic~lly rid. the content of intuition of all its 
I • , 
external and sensible features, .beginning wi t 'h the 
·"' ' 
activity cif i_nwardizipg. 
Since the dialectic of Vorstell~ng i~ the 
process which c~ditions the emergence .of thought and 
. .. ., ., 
. 
since it is ~he precise nature of , the relatio~ of 
- .· , 
Vorstellung to though''t: which is at 'issue here we must 
t J • 
. . - . 
proceed to· examine the matter at greater .leng_th. We ,. 
·will therefore follow the dialectic with great car-e,· 
I . 
beginning with the fof~ qf ~ecollection. 
(a) Recollection 
. I 
As re.collection min_d actively presents itself 
with a · content. This is the image and the · process of · 
·· - it~ creation unfolds /,in three phases. ~ The first is its 
. \ 
. . 
actual formation~ its · liberation from a particular 
• , . I . 
. .,, '""'- ... 
38 
spatio-tem~eral existence. As ~ re~ult of this liberation 
' I ~ 
the image also becom~s more general and ceases to exist 
in a one to one correspondence . with its mother object: 
11Whereas the · immediate presence of the thing is' necessary. 
' . . 
for feeling and intuition, I can _form a mental image . 
. of something :wherever.., I am, even of what is rem~test · .·· · 
from ·me in external space and time. " 25 .. It is · this 














fr~edom1 which gives the image its status as a ' universal; 
the same freedo~ o~ .universality which thpugh quite · 
. I 
· · ).lndeveloped at this point consti tu'tes the actual;;·natur·e ~ 
. . I 
of mind. The image is more universal th~n the intuition , 
, 
because it is more 'ment'al', more in con'formity with · 
the nafure~ of mind: 
• < 
Having·- formed its image in this way, recoliection 
proceeds in its second phase to forget it. 
I 
our mind does not keep the 'infinite number of 
i~ages it ,possesses foreve.r before it. Most of them 
. ~ : 
. )Jlind ·Supp:r=esses or forgets, al·lowing them to drift ·off 
39 
' . . . 26 
into the unconscious or· "night-like mine. of the intell~ot. "1 I -
' • I 
However, they, are· still the property of the . in'!:ellect 
an,d can .be. recalled :qy i .t at any :time. Th.is facility, 
as_ it _. were, is mind itself present ~, this universal 
power over its images. 
" 
But as · recollection, i~ _is beyond . the intellect's 
.-capacity to recall an ima·ge -at will. • I Rather, an 1mage . ·. 
requir'es · a new intuition to bring it back · in·to existence ·: 
. I . " 
" •.. ·what is sfrictly call~d recognit~on·is t~e reference· 
of the image' to an intuition' - and that as a subsumpti:On ' ·. 
• I • I J ' ' t • 
. . 




.. .. . . 
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is , in. point of form universal, uhder the representation. 
. . . 
'(.idea) · with' the same content. n 27 :.r~ this adtivity rn·ir;.d J-· . . . • • . 
authenticat~s- its image, transforms it ·from a . property 
'.. 
to~ a possession (i.e. has it activeiy·· ~resent.befote it), 
and ' at'the same time distinguishes i~ from the intuition 
Q. 
. und~r ·which impetus ''i ~ had .been· .recalled. ."Intelligence , is 
thus the force which can give forth its property, and 
~ ! 
dispense with external intuition for it~ existehce in 
it: "~a_· Further; II this 'synthesis' of the internal image 
I ' 
with the recollected .existence is represent'ation proper: 
. . . . . 
• l) , 
.. b¥, this . syn~hesis _the internal· now ha·s the qualification 
. 
of being able to be present before intelligence and to 
have its e~istence in ,it. "2·9 ,But ·as such. intelligence 
has ceased to be· recollect~on an<jl has bec_ome imagination, 
the secon~ · form of Vorst'ellung. 
·., {b) Imagination · · 
... 
. 
It is its depende~ce u~on . exter'~ai . stlmulatio~, 
,, 
, . or·, " its ~i~ability to recall an. 'image at will whi~h · 
~ constitutes the ne~a,tive element iri recollection. ~he 
-·nature of · mind is freedom, the freedom to ·exercise its 
. ' 
27PM,' ss 454. 
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, . , r , 
' 
·capacities inqependently olf ·einything but its own will, 
I 
and in. recollection this is still unrealized. Recollection 
does not ~onforrn to ·the' notion of mind. :fts in~er 
'o 
impetus to freedom, in cotiformity with iis implici~ 
. ----- I . 
.'nature as mind preci~itat_es ~he transfo~ation from 
' I 
Again,· the importance of · . 
. . 
recollect ion to 
. 
this .transforma 'o·n should- be seen in the continuing 
' ; 
liberation of dete~ination ' by an external 
. . 




-Repeated reca,lling of an image makes· a :ne'W 
i'ntui tion ·uimecessary. This unaided activity of recalling' 
,.. . . ' ' ... '• . 
i'mp~es ip ·the reproductive imagination. The element . of. -' · 
' \ . . ' ·. . ~) 
spontaneity is the rriai~ feature dis'tinguishing· this ' new 
- . ~ ' ~ . . 
for~ ~rom. reqol~ection. - ~t - is c!'lso indicative of mind'-~ _ 
. . . . . . . ,. ,' '• 4 • .. 
. incre~sing power. ·This new power is further developed 
. . , . ' 
'in the ·phases of associative and creative imagination. 
. • t • 
: . The connec~idn of · ~~ages ' wit~ one anothe~ is : · · 
an ~ct~vity of a higher order than their ' ·simple 
reproduction . . The performing of this higner .order 
a_ctiv:ltY is the associative imagination. · 
Since _irnage s possess a content that is basically · 
sensible il! its origin t?ey· may p~ ~~mpared and iinked .· 
with ·one another. ·I- -This :linking is perforrned ' by_ my mi,nd . 
. ' __. 
and thu~ ."intelligen~e gives the images a subjective bond . 
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42 
1 
in place. of th.ei·r objective on~." 3?· Ho~ever, a d~vergence . 
still exists b~tween the c'onnect~ng in.tell:i.g.ence and· 
the connecte~ images; the latter. have-not be~n integrated. 
.. . ' . . .; . 
into a fully a~t~ve subjectivity: This is the work · of 
t}:le creative imag-ination to which .the associative gives. 
rise. The negat~y~ element is 9gain, the~, th~~ lack 
of. conformity wi tl) 'the notion' .the fact' that· mind is 
still not a fully const~tuted subjectivity, and it is 
th1s ·negatlyity which · f~rces the associative imagination 
. ' . . 31 ' 
to become creat1ve. 
, I • ' 
' 
- As associative l"m·a~inat'i~n, ·:in~elli.gence is 
sif(lply the )ower of ' connec~ing or' associating images. 
. . . . . '-
• . As this simpl~ power it fails to produce the - idea or 
't, ' I - I • ' - 'l ' • • \ 
.Vorsteilung~ . This is : its limi~ -and the .'c~us~ of ~t$ ~ 
own· .negat;i.o~ . . ~n 1~r·e~tiv,e i~ag_in~ti~n ·intelligence . 
. I . 
po,ssesses . the added dimensi~n-· that . i 't; is'·· aware that it . 
·· i~ the connec~ing power, · and~ '1 • • • it is in t ~rl}ing my 
. • .. • • I ... 
attention to this co~~ection thaf. I · ~rri.ve at . general 
. . 
ideas · (Vorstellungen), or to ideas · in the · strict~sense 
' ' Further, . i _n". providing its ideas 
. . . 
30PM, ss 455~ zusatz . I ' 
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(Vorstellungeri) with an objeclti've· existel}ce in lancjuage-
c.reat.ive .. illlfgination corripl~tes . t~e p;oce~s--pf produc~ng 
the Vorstellung •. 
· As · creative i~ag~n.ation · int~~ligel')ce '' ._· . _. c·ea'ses 
'tO be _the vague mi~e ~nd . the · u~iyersal, ahd beoomes_an _ 
in;ividuality! a concrete 'Su~jec~ivity. ~. ~- .. )J. _It ~r~vi~es 
this new. concrete s~bject~~ity' with : an:· obj~ct~ve . exi:st~nce · 
I 
in languag~, at first .symbol~~al~y. an~· the~ vi~ t~~ 
. . . 
sign: it ••• -now j..t.s act.i'on as - reason (i~telligence) . . is: . fl 
• ' ' . ' • • I 
., . . I ... • , • 
from the present point directed towards g·iving ·the 
- - • I ' • - . . , • • I . I 
character of an existent to what: in it· has been· perfected - - -
I - , ' • , • , ' . , . • • .' o ( ' • ( 
to conc~ete aut~-intuition. In · other words·, 1it aim~ at . 
-·-mAking itself .be·and be, a fact. Actin~ on this · yfew~ . ~t 
· · is ·self.~utt~rit;lg, i _ntui tion-propucing ;_ · the irnag inat~on -.' .· 
h • h ·, t ' • 1 ' 11 34 w 1c crea es ~1gns. 
,• .. 
In ~ts :manifes~ation as 9r~~tive i~agination 
intellige~ce first (in· t}:le se ns_e . . qf · dialectica lly f i'rst)' I 
provid~s itself with an- authentic · e~is·t:·er:tce symbolic~lly. 
.. •• '" .. I .... " • 
'\ ' ' 
"T.his auth-entication i~ ·, however / i t 'self ·immedi.ately .sttl l 
~ . 
a subjecti'O'e · cine , since in,t elligence in th~. ·fir s t i nsta.nce 
• 1 ~ • • , · 
Sti~l· haS regard fOr ·the given 'COfltent Of- the . imag-eS 1 i 's 
, .. ' • • • • ' 
1
r • •• t • • 
·. ,· . . . . . - . 35 
· g~i~r:: - by i't ~n . s~o_l1~~ng,' 1ts ge~eral 1deas . .'" , · In • 
,. 
.--t 
'34p 4 7 
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" exp~essing itself symbolically intelligence .has achieved· 
only a conditional fr~edbm. '>rhe symbol is a. 'iimi ted ' 
'• I' ,. . . 
form of expression in that possessing an independent 
content .pf its own, it only accidentally provides 
. ' . . ,· 
/ . 
,_ 
iritel~ig'ence with the ;·rneans of ~xpressing its own nature· . . 
I 
For :this reason, the tr_ansition ~rom a sy_mbolic mode of 
• . • i ' • • ' 
expression to a significative one in 'the s_ign marks a great 
• • 0 
.. ·advanc~ .in the -liber.ation of intelligence and its· capacity 
' 
for self•exprespion. 
' Th9.· d~alectical ~mergence of the · significative 
form of expression from the symbolic occurs 1n 'the 
I, . 
oollowing way. In u_niting· its· inner self (the idea) 
, . • I 
with the .content o~ the symbol and thereby ·achieving a 
I ' 
mediated form of authentication or existence; intelligence 
I 
as universal ~s, in essence! on!y uniting with itself., 
and, in recognizing this turns the mediated' form .around 
• I 
.. 
''By this . dialectical movement, the to become 'immediate. 
J 
. 
general idea 1Vorstellung) re~~hes the · point whe~e it 
no long~r needs th_e :image 's c~ntent for its au~h~n~~c~t~otJ. 
but, is authenticated in an~ xor itself . alone, is therefore, 
- . 
' ·. '• ' . 36 . immediately · val~d." Further: ~'. • .• the ge~ral idea 
/, '" 
' "\ I . " . (Vorstellung) , liberated from t~e i mage's content, in , . 
, ma ki ng i t s freely selected extelnal mater~al. into some thing 
.. 
, I 
·t ' ' I • I \ . 
. •' 
- l 
3p . . 
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that can b~ intuitively perceived, produces what has. 
"'- . I . ~ .. -
to be called,a .sign, in spe~ific · di~tinction ~~om 
. ) 
!;;yrnbol.-" 37 The $ign, 'bherefore, is a signifi.cant 
advance over th'e symbol. ,,In,te l 'ligence ~o longer require~ 
. I ' 
the'con~ent o1 sen~ation or intuition to ~r6vide itself 
. .. . 
;- with j ~b j ""c~i yec existen~;,. • Rather; it has . succeeded 
iri 'liberating i 'tself fr()m such· a . req'uirement and 
prov_ided i .tself with an obje~tiye : ex;i.stence on the ... · 
; 
strength 9f its own self . . ~. 
The objectifying of subjec'tivity which· creative 
I . . . 
ima'gination effect's · ·i _n the sign is .. bqth. ~ ts moment . ~-£ 
~ 
triumph a,nd the b~ginning of its .dissblution. For the 
~ -
nature' of the sign as an ". · .• inunediate .' intuition, representing 
··a totally different import from what n~turally belong~ 
• I . . 
t . .·t /1138 0 l. •••. 
' I 
. th~ s~bjective ~hich intelligence, in_ ·its caP.aci-ty as 
. . . 0 
creative imagination, is unable to bridge, b.ut,- which, 
• • q ... • 
I : • / • 
in conformity· with 'its · notion, r it must. 'Intellige't1ce 
- • ._ • ' . ~ ·. I . . 
I I ' - .... '---.. . 
·as Vor:st~llung ·therefore ·c;.eases to be an "imaging" · 
. . I · . • '" . ' , t • • 
I 
activity and becomes one.of "memorizing •. II 
.!;/ I 
·' • 
37PM, ss 4•57, Zusatz • . . 
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< c >.- Memory . ' '·· 
' "! I .. . 
.. 
As creati~e lrnaginatio~ intelligence · g~ves itself 
an-~objective existence in the .word-..· However,· as a result . 
it ~inds itself in a state ~f ·s~~f·-aliemation;. a gulf 
appears be'tween the ext~r~al : ~~d\ the i~ter~al which·, as 
,' 
creatiye imagination ~t is·unable · to overcome. In order 
to re-inwardize the new ·intuition ·- which the' word is.- . 
it must ce?~e -to be an ima'ging activity ·arra· become one 
of memor.izing. In its new guis_e intelligence ~s ,the 
. . -,· activity 'of , overcoming the .dis tinction I between the ~ word ,' 
I ' 
.. · · 
.. ·and its meaning. . Memory i .s the_refore ·the. culminating 
.· . ' 
. form of Vorstellung and. form~ the transi.tion· to think~ng 
. ·"' 
or cognition .. - the 'actualized notion of intelligence. 
In its,first t~o phases memory · ~cts as ·:w~ 
commonly understand it to do:it is. the activity o _f ~nking . 
the ·word a~d · its meaniJ!g.'_· . Thi~ result~-: ~n t~e ach verne~_t · 
of an ability to_ ·link a .wc;>rd with its . meaning at ~i . .. 
The ac1rivity is ~ignificant' fo'r two .rea.sons: first 
fj 
. . ' 
because rn:j.nd is here de.~ling : . only with its own ·cr~ati~ns; 
.". . . memory has ' ceas.ed to ·,deal with an image. derived 
. ' ' . . '. . . ' . 
. . from int'uition .- 't:he immediate ,and inco'rnplete It\~delo£ 
1 I 
iut~lli~ence; · it has ·rather t8 d·o with an objept; which : is 
th~ · ~roduct - of intelligence itself~~··"lg It-is this -
,. ,· 
_:.39 ' . . 
PM, · ss 462. 
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absence of' sensible content which :accounts for our need 
. . 
to memorize the meaning of words .. And . secondly, we 
l oll ' I 
' .. 
-f::hii:lk in names. 
Our · thoughts on~y become known tops when 
expressed, w~en put 'into words~ The achievement of a 
fully .manifest subjectivity is consequent on it~ 
. exterri~lizati~n in langu~ge. According to .~ege~~ "we 
only know our · th~ughts, ·only .have d~finite" , actual· 
· . thoughts, · when .~e give them . the form of objectivity~ . 1 • •.•. 
I 
. ' 
of a .being 'distinct .from our inwardness 1 and · therefore 
. . . . . 
. . 
' .the shape of . ·externality·, and of · an externality, t~o, ·:-
o t ·:hat. at the same time· bears the stamp of the- -highest . 
. ' 
· · inwardness.· Th~ · articulated~· ~ou,nq; .. ~he word, is .alone ·· 
, . 
. such an .. inwar~ externality. ~ ~~ As '_the ~nward ext~rnality 
·it· is the .actualize~ · ~~r~t~~.lung~ -~ ·. · 
... The parado~ical fact th'at our thoughts achieve 
- . . 
'th.e1r highest e!(istence in being cast out into the world 
is ~P keeping·· with .1our e~r~ier· d~finition .of mind · ·a~ 
'manifestation'.. However-,· the nature · of this ~anifestation 
,~ " . . . ~ ·. 
is not one, of · dir~mption or separation, ·b~t.,~ rather 
: demands the un~ ty _of: .s~bj ect·:. an<:l object. I .t · is the · . . · 
function of mechanical · memory to fulfi'l this demand. ··· 
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' ~ I ~ 
: Mechanical memol7y : continue·s t'h~ process of, .. . 
.. ~ .. . . .... . .. . . ' . 
.- inwardi'zing- OF eliminating the word-m~an.:i.ng ·distinction. · 
·. . . . 
I J t " t I 
ThiS occ.urs in the ~ollc_:>wing way . .. In linking the thought 
. ' 
with the ~ord intelligence" ... receives into i~self 






which ' tne word is). . . . \. . Acc_or~ingly, Hegel c~.a~ms, intelligence 
·takes on the meanin.g o_f the th{~g; -~t .ceases .. to dist:i,_nguish . 
. be(-we_~n. its ·subjectivit~ c;lnd the thi~g, or ·betwee'n the 
.. 
. subj~·c.t an,d 'object·, ,·and thereby assumes . t:he nature ·of a 
mechanical existence. It ~~~omes "··~ a mindles~ container 
I . • •• 
of:words, ' that is, a mechanical·memory. 114'2 ' ~s such_, · . J. ' . 
. ft~lligence -succeeds. i~ ~nt_egra_ting_ .th~ word · and its 
' . 
;_ . .'meaning or in · re- inwardizing. the new intuition. 
.. ... 
·. 
• ! . 
Having eliminated any impe;· ·ment ' to its freedom 
' t 
. . 
expression inte·lligence beComes 'empty' , a pui:-e . . · ·· ·· of I'"""' ·· 
poi:.entia+ity in wh_ich the mastered word can ·be used ·at . . ' . 
will, · no·.lo~ger as a . ~ehiole for inteilige~ce · but, literally, .· 
' # ' t' • I 
as . intefllgen~e itself. Thus it ' is the functi~n of ~emory, 
a ceo~ ding to Hegel, "to level the ground of the inner life · .
... ~ . ~ . . . 
. : ' . 
to pure beirig, or to pure space i~ which the fact ,•· the·· : ·· 
·. ' 
. . 
·imp_licit 'content) may reign and .unfold 'itself with no . 
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.. o• 49 • 
•. . 43 -~ritithesis d~ a sub)ective inwardness. II . As a' result 
• 4_ 0 • • e \ ~ 
· • of its memo~l~i-~g · act·i vi ty intelligenc~ hci.s • actuali~ed 
0 • ~ . • 
I '"' ' - : 
. . .' . 0 & . 
th~. f_reedom o~ universality which was its implicii; 
' 
.. nat~r~ ... al! . a19~g .' It is now manifest as cogni tiQn or 
. :'rJ. . . • • 4 
• · thinking.-. . · ' 
.· .. . 
I , n ' 
t • ' • • "' 1) 
. (4) Re~son and Conclus1ort of Chapter 
\ . 
. . 
We ~ave been tracing the psycpological develop-
. \ ' .. . 
rnent of mind, 'of ,its intellect or· faculty of cognit~pn. 
•l 
• • 0 " • 
This process :i,.s .. c~rnpleted with mind's. rnanifestation~as 
. ' 
thinki~g o~ ' cognition,•with the faculty .of reason. 
• • .; • ' .. - - • . 0 no • ~ 
· t" Acc9rdin~ to ~~gel, "~hiJ1)~ing is . the third", and 
,? 
: last rnai~ $.ta9e in the development of intelligence; for .. 
':1 ~ . 
· · in ·i~the .immediate, implicit unity of' subjectiV"ij:y ,and 
-ob~ec~ivity ~re~ent .. in intuiti-on . ip .. re.stor~d 'oJt ~f· th·~· 
. ... .. . 
. .. 
, . 
opposition .of the_se two sides in rep~esemtci"tion ' as a · ,--.P 
l,\nl ty ~~r.iched .. by this. ppposi tion ;· henc.~ .as~ a unity both ./ · } .. 
. . . .· ' " . . . . ' ~ . 
• 
0 d 1' n 44 . . . . d v 11 
·xn ess~nce an ·actua 1ty. , o As ~1ntu1t1on an . orste ung _ 
0 
inte~li~ence was only cognition imp~icitly, in conformity 
' .,.., a o 
with its notiqn. - It is now such explicitly"or actually~ 
• r 
'~The end is accord.i_flg ly bent back into t)1e beg inn,,ing .. "~ 5 
·' 
.(,. 
". ~ 0 
•
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This .new unity ·is achieved by -<rirtue of _thought's . . 
recognition of i .tself ·~s "the na'ture of the thing." 4? 
Thoyght recognizes that the essent~al nature of its obj~ct 
• !,o .., tj I • 
is· that fbe comprehensible; that it b.;· thoUght. The 
• 
1 
r<rcogniron. that the truth of milid i~~ t\'ought is ·the end 
result of our psychological s~udy. According to_Hegel, 
"pur~ th~nking knows that it a1ane, an~ not feeling·ur 
•i 
,. 
trutn··. of ' 
. -representation, is capable of grasping the 
0 
.. 47 ;, tljtings. 
.. 
' 
The most. signific_ant point of our discussion 
' 
.. ' 
has been the demonstra~ion that formally, Vorste1lung 
and thinking are rela~~d dialecticilly; the latter emerges 
I , -
out of the former .as the truth of its nature', as that 
. ' . . . 
towards ·Which it str.ove ·a·nd , to which it ·gave birth through 
its o~ri sel~-negation. The !'ink ~etween VorstellUJig. and 
· r~?son, as faculties of mind, · is an inner one, existing 
necessarily, by ~irtue 'cif the n~ture of mind itself·. It 
'' . . I ·. • I ' 
is a relation that ~~ revealed in its true form only 
. t 
.~ thro~gh a dialectical·ex~i~at~on such· as we have under-
taken. ~- . . 
~hought and Vo'rsteliung, thinki~g and "imag-ing" 
4 ' 
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simply opposed, as ~istinct modes of· mind's cognition. 
. . ,_ 
It • 1 1•1 1 ~atper, as 'the following through of the dialectic of. 
Vork:~ll~ng ha~ demonstrated, a 'fully developed 'faculty' 
. of 'imaging' is an· absolute prerequisite 'to thinking; 
. . . 
·~bought de~ends on ~ already established linguistic 
. . I I ' 
· structures to give it an existence. This is Hegel's 
. . 
.meaning when he states that ·"we think ·in names~, and 
. ., .. . 
- 'I · ' I point;-s to the ·famo_us attempts ,. by Mesmer· to think inst"ead · 
. : •I • I -
51 
directly in .images, "?1 procedure which, as Mesmer admitted, 
48 I . 
almost drove hiin insane." Mesmer.' s; experiment both 
demonstrates that .thinking cannot be re~uced ' to th~ 
activity of "imaging" 'and that we cannot .think without 
•I 
· . images rnetarnorphiz.ed . into .words. Vorst_elll;}ng, then, 
maintai~s its autonomy as 




an explicit form col).,tained within 
I 
the latter has ·rendered obsol~te · ,. . . 
but~as the condition of though~'s possibil~ty. 
~ 
- Having revealed this intef-relation bn the 




chawter, via the same dialecti cal methq,c;L:_tO-dernenstrate-· ------~-
' ' . 
that such is alsp the case in the conc~ete sphere of 
mind's manife~tation, as 'religion and as philosophy. 
•!' 










CHAPTER ' III 
I 
'THE DIALECTIC OF .THE""RELIGIOUS. CONSCIOUSNESS 
., (1) , Intrqduction 
In this· third chapter we 'continue ·our examina·tion 
o'f the re!ation of Vorstellung and thought begun . in 
·chapte_r two. Here we will eiarnine it in its coiJ,crete 
· fprm:. the rQelation ·of religion anc'! philosophy. 
Ouv goal· ·is to. clarify the relation of religion 
·, . 
and phil_osophy in Hegel's system. " We claim that relatiGn 
,· 
•1 ·is dialectical in . :Lts nature and· can only be comprehended 
\' ·.as such. 
- / 
In light of th~s, ·we further claim that the 
. ' 
· nature -of that relation cari ·be expl<~~ated through an 
· e·~amina·tion of ·the religious consciousness. such· an 
examination,· we think.., · will reveal the dialectical 
structure which is the true nature of ~r~e±atiTin. 
~--·--__..;,...._-
'.I 
_:......----- ~--.----=rr~n-the following ppges, t:h€m, we· hope - to.defend · . 
.. 
• 0 
Hegel's thesis that religion and P,hilo,sophy_ w,hile distinct~ 
are not antithetical modes of consciousness. · ·Fu'rther, we 
. ' ,.._ 
- hope to ·Show how religion and philosophy a;e for Hegel · 
-not related in any ~mpi :dcal :or contingent· _way, but · 
·  dialectically, such that :philosophy emerges as a result · 
• : Q' ! • 
~ ' I ) -
·of - the inner transformation of the religious consciousness 
' 















.,~ •.. :, 
., 
nature of their relation is·no~ only evident from 'an 
examination of the religious consciousness, but, can be 




seen as well from an examination of t~e history of ~eligion. 
' ' I 
Our dej~nse of the preceding requires that ~e 
fifst clarify the essential features of the religious 
attitude as a whole, : as a unity_ o:tjform and content. We 
shall then, examine .the _dialect~cal interact~on ~J.~f1orm 
and ·content, following through the .former's attempts 
to. ·give adequate expression to the latter. We hope this 
will de~onstrate the true means of comprehending the 
relation pf religion . and philosophy to be the s .tudy of the 
dialectical transformation of the former, and, conseque~tly, 
. . 
... 
not in any attempt to dedll;ce "t;he .one from the other, ot: tq , . 
(I 
compare them as qisparate standpoints, as we have found 
.. 'Hegel' s· critics to have done • 
. However, if ·9ur discussion were to end here it 
I , . 
would be incomp+ete. For it· is not enough to show that 
---------~~~~c=o=n=c=e~p~t=u=a~l=l~y · religion and P-hilosop~~r~lated-in-tn1s 
way; we ,must a·lso show tha~e same conclusions _can be 
" 
. ( ~ . . 
drawn f;rorn an examination '~·the history of religion as 
' 
well. Thus, ·subsequent to our study of the dialectic · of 
the religious conscious~ess we will brieflytexarn~~e i ts 
concrete ~istori~al .manifestation~ 
\ 
' I . 











. ~ : 
J 
(.2) The rEfli-gious s:ta,n~point in g.ener~l 
/' 
The essence of the ;eligiou~ aititude lies in 
its claim that · "God ·is the absolute tru~h, the truth of 
everything, and t .hat religion alone is absolutely true· 
. 1 
kpowledge." Phi-losophy. in turn seeks to comprehend 
·, . 
the m~aning of this statement. The philosophy of religion 
is ~he ·process of this comprehension; a process in which 
philosophy ·seeks to mediate the religious attitude and·to 
~li~i t ·~tJ essentia~ f·~atures. · 
Religion, then, has to do with the nature or , 
notion of God, and any attempt by philosophy to grasp .the r· , 
nature of religion must begin by comprehending the nature 
' 
of this religious object. ~~e basi~ definition giYen . 
Him by· religion · is that 
Enccimpassing, "the 'only 
He is .a Qniversal, a ~ne or all 
. ' .. 2 
true r,ality." As it stands the 
definition allows of no ·form of differentiation or 
54 
----------.d:t1:t:' sstt±i TJnccctton: alLl.s-croo and arT-contaJ.ried ·~ u i HJ.rn ~ As 
such, admitting of no distinction, the definition is· 
. . 
inherently one-sided. It allots no. plac;::e to · tne believer, 
to man's consciousness of God. ·The recognition that the 
. ,. I . l . 
notion . of God must, of necessity, involve an eleme~t. of 
. I 
1 . ' 
:Lectures on the Philo~ophy of Religion, Vol. I; p. · 90. 
2 . 









~~lation,· or that~religion is ~ssen~Lally a relation of 
man to God, only aris~s as a result of a shi_ft -in emphasi? 
away from the objec~ivit~ of God's existence to the 
' subjec~ive side, to His existence in our consciopsness. 
· The recognition tbat religion is essentia~ly a 
I 
relation is both the great . insight of the modern age and . 
~ . 
-1 ~J I • 
its great prejudice. · Its value lies ih. its recognition. 
that "God is. not to be considered apart from th~ su~jective 
spirit, " 3 or, in . the :recognition · that· man's . relation to 
Gdd is ap inner relation 'of spirit. Its g~eat prejudice 
is that it treats "more of religion than of. Godl . . " 4 The 
~bdern age, having shifted its emphasis from the objectivity 
f 
of God's existence to the experience-of God on the part 
of the believer has created an imbalance in the truth 
· of th~ matter as gn~ at ~s that found ·in the ·definition · 
·of God as a pure substance. By· emphasizing the dialectica'l 
' ((_ ~ 
·in-terpenetration of the subjective and objective sides 
Hegel claims to achieve the balance ,whiqh is the truth 
of'the rela tion. 
What, ·. ·for Hegel, the religious at·ti tude does 0 iS 
situate the immediate or finite world i ·n terms of its "" 
' 
3 i bid. ' p. 101. I' 
-

















. ' ·/ ' 5 ' 
· "absolut(jubstant:i,al. essence,., i.e. in terms· of· its 
t ~ • ·- • 
. end or goal. . "Relig1on," he states, n - is the· conscious-
.. . 
I 
.. ne,:;s of wha't is in and for- itself tr.ll(~, in contrast' td. 
I , ' ' 6 , 
sensuous; finite truth and to sense perception." It . 
·. 
ts a transition from the ·finfte w¢rld and a _recognition 
of ~ t i~ ter~~ of an Other,_ .i.e • in /terms of' ' that · which 
is not sensible and finite bUt rather, .infiriite. How~ver, 
I 
' it is a turn to an Other which is. related to the finite 
. · world not only as its -- end,· b~t as·_ its· s'ource .as w.ell. The. 
. . I l-
Other_ is .recognize9. as the p_o~er over the finite world. 
In possessing this point of view, according to Heg.el I 
- . •• - - J ' 
56 
"the standpo.irit;. of religion shows _·itself in- this , transi-tion 
as the ·standp6int of trut'h, in whJcn the whole weal~ 
the natural 'and ~piritual wo'rld is\:o~tained." .. ·7 ;s su~J, 
religion is the first, true absolute point of view. 
~ ' ' I ' 
( 3) ·The necessity of the· religious standpoint 
-
- -· ----------,----'--Ha..V-ing-outl.iJ.:le.Lthe_g_e.ng~al ri?l ture of the· 
- ---·---
religi,ous standpoint,. Hegel sets abou1; t~ prove ,its 
necess'ity as a mode of spi'rit • . Such .a, proo~ ' J;l}u;3t not, 
• J.. . - : 
'4- '. -





rbid. I p. '105. 
. . 
6 ' . . . 
Ib1d. I p. 106. 
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opposed to the standpoint of the finite world and finite 
.., · - 1 ' 
spiritual life. Rather, _the demonstratipn re~ts · on a 
co~ception of 'nature and finite consciousness · accord~n~ 
to which th.ey 11 • • • in accordance ~i th their n~tion 
abrogate or annul themselves, and'!the_i ,r finiteness must 
not be taken ~rom them merely by a subjective remova·l 
of .their limits. ,.a 
-57 
Possessing.· no .suhstantial or. ~nd.epender:tt existence· 
the finite world is the scene of constant turmoil and 
· ~unrest; it is coritinuall.y., engaged in a process of self-
/ . 
annul~ent, the truth of which is not present in · it 
_directly,· but, ratl)er, ' i·~ terms,of the Idea, which ·both 
transcends this finite existence and is i .tSI underlying' .. · 
. ' ) \ 
·principle o.r absolute_ prius. - '!!he religious .standpoint 
--is -precisely that in which this truth becomes evident 
and i-s copsciously· _ apprehend,ed by .th~ religious individual. 
. I . . 
For the religious ·individual, then, Nature is the 
. ' 
1::11tl.mate truth,. so that Spirit (Idea) · p_rov,es itself to :) 
I ·• : 
be the. truth. of Nature." 9 _And just ?S this activity of · ' 
-- T-- - ~ 
. 
self-annulment and transformation is the truth of .Nature 
I 




8Ibid., p. 109. .. 
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Spirit, Hegel claims, appears in two essential 
forms: (1) as ~hat it is in and for 'itself, it!:? notion, 
' . 10 
or, fufly, developed state, "e~closed' in the Idea;" ' 
, , I , 
I 
and ~~) as subjectivt, ~articular conscioti~ness; a 
condition in which it is fi~i~e, being related to an 
object other th~n itself. The pr~cess of Spirit's 
• I development is that of reconciling (1) and (2) such 
. /" I 
that "absolute" Spirit i~ . the perfection of con~ciousness 
in so far as it is consciousness of the true object and 
I 
the true object att~ins to its -a~propriate form of· 
self-consciousness. Thus in its ultimate form spirit is 
the merging of an · iprinite fgrm and an infinite content. 
This achievement is· th'e religious ' standpoint. 
. ' ' Spirit, as par·ticular consciousness, ·is fin·i t-e 
pr!i5-isely becau s~ i .t ~x~sts in a condition of relatior1 
to what appears to be alien to it, with an · existence which 
.. 
appears to be non-spiritual. The recognition of art 
inherent~y rational dimension to this 'other', . and the 
58 
- .------,- - --act-fvi-t-y -of--man-i-festing-~t_ ,.. . ....is .. ...identic..~l __ wi th _?.:eJE.~.!.:~ s 
. \ ' --·-- ·--- ----·-- ---
·- -. . ~ 
\ • f • • • 
· emergence to "a concrete, absolute existen~e as ehe self-
\ 
consciousness otf ·the Idea. Spirit, then, achieves the 
. \ 
\ 
status of· 'absblute' consciousness when "rationality exists 
\ 
\ u 
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' ' , I -
- I 
, I 
or, rationality as such, as it~ object. - I 
I , 
It is t:Q.us the irnplic±t overpoming of the · alier:t· 
dimension of finite. existenc'e which ' constitutes the 
r ·e_ligious standpoint, in ~hich "God is Object · of ' 1 
· consciousness as abso,lute Power and Substance into which 
I 
the whole' wealth· of the natura~, as of the spiritual 
. . . 12 
world has returned." In its characterization of nature · 
and finite spirit in· this · rnanneT, the religious s~and-
' I , 
poi.nt demonstrates ·.th~t - it ·is .the : f i rst (dialectically 
speaking) to exist in and for its~lf; .-~t is ~he first .. 
~ Whi; . i; I?-Ot based on some . presupposition but, rather, 
Jre~zes itself as 17he absolute basis and goal of all 
that. has gone 'before. · Thes_e ~re the nec,essary features 
'I ' 
9f the ·religious · standpoint as a form ·of spirit. 
· There is, as ~ell\ an internal ne?es s i ty to the 
relig~ous attitude: I the di~lecti9 of the 'religious 
·, consciousness iri its own interriq.l form and development. 
Havin~ sketched the nature of. the religious consciousness . 
with -regards' its external necessity we turn now .to · an 
• • • • c 






examination of -its Hiternal necessi'ty_ and its internal 
_. --·-7 _ _ :______ - - -4· ------- -~------·----· · ---~ -- --·-;- ----;- ~~-- · . ,_~r-------~---
trans formations. 
12Ih;d. ,.~ 113 ... p. ~ 
- . 












· ( 4) The intern9-l dialectic of this st<;mdpoint . · 
We must examine,the religious consciousness "as· 
I 
appears in a conditio~ of~ relation, and . fashion~ : 
and- develops the forms· of this relation: until -the . inner ' , .. 
nece~_si ty develops and attains cornp:]..etene.ss . ~n the 
. . 
' . ~ 
notion itself," 13 or,· untii- the religio~s consciou-sness. 
achieves the limit' of its form . The fact that· the · · 
. ~ I I -
religious consciousness is inherently r~latiopal possesses· 
' ' 
great significance; The ~eli~ious conshi~usness is 
.. • - ! • 
. 
I 
essentially in rela-l!:ion to truth and ' not united with it. 
It -is therefo;~. of the' nature of this slan~point to ; 
. I 
. ' I 
assert that there <=7an never ·be anything 1 but a relation 
to truth on ' '\ the part . of the finite, humail' being. Religion, 
l - I • t I 1 • 
nature places truth in a ',beyond' ·. The · by . its . very 
,dialectical development pf the. religiou~ con~ciousne~s, 
. . ·. . . . ' 
however, will be seen to point beyoi\d . itself to _ a for·m 
. of ·consciousness which 'reveals tru~h inl its_ actu~l nat-ure 
• I 
' 
· and is united with _-'it. This is the sta dpo_int of ' ' . 
phil~s~phy or reason 'proper, _ 'and it is Jo · thi~ sta~dp~ln~ 
.. 1 . that._.' the develop~f.~ religious conscious es.s tends. ,, . 
I . 
}'lhile the religious attitud'e po sesses a divers! ty 
of forms they are all . characterized by eing the 
13 b . d . . 115 
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I • . 
: 
·consciousness·.·of God, and all posses_s ,the -ce~tainty of 
, • ' I • . 
His ·exis:temce. · It is. not eno.ugh there~ore to deal with 
. ~ ... . . . . 
the subjective side or' the ob}gctiv~ si?~ alone, the 
fori~er bei~g exemp·l~fied by the pre":....religio~ form of · 
·'feeling' and the latter by that of in·t.uitio~. 14 
. . j · Rather ' 
. 
the two sides must be . considered in relation to e·ach 
other,· in the true form of the religious . t:oi?sciousne~ s, 
that of Vorsteilung • 
' ' 
-. 
It .is at this point, as we discus·s .. the nature of · 
the religious consciousness, .or Vorstellung, tha~ we; begin 
to dis~inguish it from thought or philosophy. In chapter' 
two we pointed . to the proximity of Vorstellung · and thoughi,. · 
'i • • ' • 
. I' 
in _the dialeo.tical em~rg~n~e· of. the 'fa.cu~ty' . of . co"gnitio~ r; · 
This · pro?'<:imity also exists concretely in the ·relation of' . ,· 
religion and philosophy. At .·first we · discU$S this 
' . 
. ' . 
relation in'. ~omparative terlJlS and in our next section 
begin to examine the nature of their dialectical rel~:ticn. 
Vorstell·Urig, 
reLigious · attitude, 
as we. W~ll contin';·· to ·~all th~ . 
falls short of bein_g truly reasonable. · 
• I 
It does not succeed in reducing· s~nsi'Q,le and finite .. ; · 
objec:ts to a truly ideal existence, which a total 
t 
~ - ~~These· protp :. o; pre-~~Jigiori~ foJ;'lTis of conscious-
ness are examined at some .iength ' by Hegel on pp' • . r~~-140. 
. 4 ·" 
' ~ 
_;· 
of L. P.R . . , . . . · ·' 
' · .. .. 
.. 
i ·. 


















' ' ' 
' ' 
.. 
· ~ ... -... 
' I' 
I ; 
. . ' 
· · · explica;tion of the nature of God or.· the Id_ea ·req1:1ires. - . · 
Vorstellung continues to.appl~·_ cate~o~ie~ rwhib~ are onl~ 
62 
' I .' ' : II 
appl~cable to the finite and sens-ible to the comprehension 
of the nature of God~ He. is ref~rred to in spat~al and 
. ' 
temporal te~rn...§_ ~hich do not apply to His ?ature . .. . ,·· .-
. , I 
Conceiyed by the· religious consciousness ip t~tm~--
,. 
applicable 'only to an object of sensat:j..on 1 God is thereby c ,. 
. . . .. . 
·.-made contingent;. and particular. ·· We ·attri_bute_ ·to· Him· 
.• such qualities as vengefulness·,or je~lousy which·, 
·purporting t _o ~escribe His true n~ture/ succeed only in 
. ' 
obscuring it furthe~. ~ 5 And e~t?n more · s~grlificantl the· ' · 
reli~ious con~ciousness as~erts th~~ -£i~ nat~~e 
L . . , 
., ,_ 
must 
remain obscu~e, being beyond the scope of human comprehens io~ • 
' ' . 
, . 
, I 
The clElim that we _ can never po.sses's t·rue 'knowled~e .. .. 1 
of ~d is an e~sent'ial feature of the relig-~o~~ . consciou~-
ne~s. Vorstellung denies thdt we ev.er have anything b~t 
' ' . 
... . 
. a relation. to truth 1 that we can 6-v~r . grasp• it • in 
1 
it~ • O~ 
totalify· ~nd ' be unite~ with· it. The religi6cis 1 conscious-
' . 




asserts that it is of the..· v:~ry ·riatur·e ·of; God' 
'a · ~elational -~~,ite~-- -~~owl-~d'ge -~f Him is · 
. ' . J' . . 
-It is · t~is . ciaim 1 essential to _the· rel?igious 
1 • 
' p ' J · 
which di-stinguish¢~ it __ fr~rn~ · phi,loso~h~. We -
\> 
'• . . 
·--..... 
. ' 
15 . L.P.R. Vol. I~ p. 147. 
.. . . . . 
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, , ~ -
" 
shall discover that it·is ,not simply in the formal 
. 
• . 0 
dialect:ic of the . religio·us consciousness itself that 
• . . ' . . 
- .; 
this ··claim is ·negated, .. but, acco"rding t<;> Hegel, the 
very hist;ry of religion is th~ clanifestation of the 
~ \ ' -
from these ~imits, imposed oy its form. It is the great 
.. /:) ~ 
'' significari~e ~f Chri~tianity that in it the religiou~ 
mentality implicitly t~anscends itself. ; . . \ 
Th1e particular nature of Vorstellung. 
. ' 
is mor~ ,. : 
" . • J • • 51 e, 
clearly def1ned when we examine it in a clo~er relation 
' . 
--
to reasdf1 an\begin to observe itS'" transition to the la·tt.er. · 
Wha~ . follows is :the co>::e Of dur ' evlde~ce .for ·c.laimi ng o 
th_at Hegel oncEFives of the. relation of r~ligion an'd 
.. · · philosophy · diale~ti.c"a-ily . . 
' J " "' 
. .... () (\ . () 
' The -willingness to. bow to ~uthority and ac~ept 
', . ' .· . ' 
truth as a matter of faith, which is the essence o f -the 
• • 0 o •o • I \ 
religious attitude, isjno~ the high~st fulfillment of the 
I <;> • 
hurnan .~pirit. There. is~ highe4 co~scio~sness - which. see~s 
0 • • 
· to know truth t-h~ough reason, · or, wh''ich seeks to I determine 
. . -I .... .. . ..... , . 
t ruth for its" own self . . This consciousness d~mands to 
. ~ () ' 
'know thingts' purely in their thought, · or notion\ ~s H_egei 
. . . . 
•• J • 
. c'alls it: "It i.s as cbmpared wit h the Notion ·. that t he 
< . 0 
'.' 
reli~~ous 'content in the mode· of idea . (Vorstellung) or 
.I 
. . \ ' . 16 
. r 
· • ordinary .thought .keeps: the f~rm of ~external1 ty·," or, the : 
• , I 
1 6 . 
i Ibid., p. 154 


































status of a .'relation to truth. Fo.t" reason, a thing is 
certain no·t as .an "e,;~errial, specific fact," ft rather · 
as ~ t?ought wpich is \dent\c~l with its object, which 
' · -permits tli.~. o~?je9t . ~o stand firm "on ·its ,ownf basis,"· 
" 
and to be 11 founded in · it.self"; this is "the' Notion which 
~ .. , 





and . in the diffeien~ia~ion remains identical with itself."17 
1 
·~· . . In thought we possess "the truth in· the fQ~m of truth 
. . 
and it .is . this .quality of . form which philosophic 
k 1 
. . 18 
now edge 1mparts to truth. ·~ 
, 
Further,GVorst~llung con?eives of·its ?h~ect as ott • 
a giv~n, --as something g'ranted ·it by ·authority: Thought, . 
,· . 
'op the other hand, .grasps the inner connection of the 
~ I v : .. o 
. ' 
1 . . ~ecessary. · ele~ents ~n~ the un~veJ:"'sality of i;ts o~)ect 
. "' . . . I . 
'ind~pendently . 'of any 'standard 'other-.. ~than itself as thinking 
, I . • . 
. • 19 ' . io . . • • . 
r:.a~on. - As1 well, · t:Plought grasps 1ts o~Ject as a tot.ali ty 
*hose elements· are entirely ' ideal~zed,"or; seem as 
: " 
·. intrerrelated in the ·context . of the whoie ~ This Vorst~llung 
' . 
fails . to -db, conceiving the elements as .independent in 
. ' .. . 20 ·. ( . . 




17w· d 154 . · ~.,' p. 
0 • 
... 
; ... lBib ' d 
-· _ _ 1_ ., p. 156. 
~9~d., p. 156. 
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20 I bid. I p. 156:,. . . 
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dist:i_nctions between Vorstellun,g · or religion and thought, 
. 
or, philosophy have now to be observed ~n more ·detail,as 
6 
we follow through the mediatio~ of the religious ·attitude 
in the form of thought. 
. - . 
;, , 





. ..... .. , . . 
- ~ 
We have already ·noted that Vorstellung posits 
i ~ 
~its-object as a given,_ as simply existing, . without in 
any way questioning the conditions or 6a~ses of that · 
·e~istence. Thus· Vorsteilu~g is ~an immedi~te form of~ . · · 
.r 
knowledge and is the opposite or ·:negative· of re-Flecting · 
~ . 
reason, which is mediated ,knowledge . . ihe ;atter s~~ks t9 
.. • • .. , .r 
*rtow the causes o~ ·its o~jec£'s exi~tence~ reflecti~g 
thcmght seeks to -comprehend its object in ··its re.lation to 
. '· 
other o?j_:ed'ts. In reflecting thought the cohtrad.ictions 
'· 
a~~ng objects is t~ereby made evident as are the reconc i ling 
factors. Reflecting ·thought· is·, . th~ref9~e, an an~itheti~al ' 
. - . 
~ode of: ~hinkiri~ ~hi~h the di'ai_ecti~_ of vo~stellung · · : ... 
··i has given risei. Both are one-sided ·, however·, as will 
. \ ~ ' 
become evident shortly. _ 
In the meantime, we mu_st note in passing that 
. . th~ ~pposi:tion and hostility between ~hese .two modes of 
though~ ~assesses ~n histor~c~l manifest~tion in the 
. . ·1 · . _'· . . ' ~ . " 
· move ment of the Eniightenrnent: - Accordi ng to Hege l, the 
~ . . ~ .. 
,, 
Enlightenment. is the .r e sult of the coming to self-
•. . •I ' . - -













emphasis from the objective side, or, Go~, to the 
subjective, or, human side _of the religious re~~~ion. 
. ' 
. The increasing em~h~s~s · O!l. th_e subje·ctive side res~ul_ted, 
' . 
wi th1. the Enlightenment, . in. the human understanding · 
b~6orning the measur~ of truth, th~ supreme mediator. 
Now the criterion of knowledge is that it be · 
mediated. As a result, Vorstellung, ·, a~ the inunediate 
knowledge ~f ·God I S .1 existence, is labelled as superstition 
.. , 
' 
and ignorance. • Since to a certain extenb .it is still 
', r 
the dialectic of idea which is ·at' ~ork here' historically' 
\ 




the AufkHlrung, which that action of under-
standing was, for the clearing up of thought. ,.2], 
The dichotomy between ~he two forms of thqug~t · 
' ' is therefore evident. With Vorstellung "immediacy is the ! . 
~~ading category .. : where the content its known in its 
simple ,relatio;n to· sel£.:· 2 ~ On the other hanq, .a·n object 
exists for t6ciught only if it possesses mediation as ari · 
·, 
essential attribute. . Hav-ing : establisped \th~ anti theses,· ip 
66 
/ 
this _manner, as arising ' oui~f the · dial~cti~ of. idea itsel f , 
Hegel ·proceeds to ask whether religion act\ial}-y is an 
·, · 
' 
21Ilfid., p. 158. 








' - .. . 
immedia~e or a -mediated knowledge. 
Both immediate and mediate knowledge when taken 
. . 
alone are one-sided. Philosophy~. or, reason unites them 
both. According to Hegel, even ~hen regarded ~rom an 
empirical point of view it . is obvious that there ~s' no 
·' 
such thing · as immediate knowledge. What may app~qr as 
' 
' I 
immediate is, ·upon a.~loser examination, revealed as 
·. . . 
67 
mediated. · · However, there are differ'ent ·forms of mediation; 
·· . ·· the mediation ~lone fi~it~ ·th~g by an Other is a 
different form tharr the mediation of reason or the Notion 
whic~:"is a mediation within tt~ei£.~23 In religion we 
' . 
' \ f . 
find this inner mediati,on at work, even a~ religion·-appears 
. ' .. 
. to be en immediate form of ~ knowledge. 
y I 
Religious knowledge is mediated. The fa.ith of a ., 
religious individual is mediated by 'instruction within' 
• . I . •, 
his religion, ~nd if the. religion · is of a revealed or 
positive nature this, too, is a mediating factor. It 
is1 th,rough f<?rgetting - this exte~nal mediation and 
concentrating on the inner side of faith that the latter 
,-r-
. ~s ·conc.~iv~d of as immediate. H~gel states that this 
• • ' I I point is s~gn1.f1.cant for "i.t involves the truth that 
posi ti_v~ reveiation cannot suJ?ply a religion fn such a, 
way that' it. could have the character of something t 











I ' ,.!!' 
· mechanically prod~ced, of -something effected from the 
- . .~ . . ~ ' 
Outside, and s~t u~ ~~thin man by an external agency."~ 4-
~his lasf is in . con~orrni~y with the notion tbat "religion, 
IV 
· -~· · justice, morality, all tha:t is spir~ tual is orily . aroused 
..! 
' in man; he is potentially Spirit, the truth lies in him, 
·and what has to be done is merely to J::?ring it ;into 
consciousness." 25 This lea~~ furtherc;., to the-notion, 
I 
essential to Hegel's concept ·of, religion, that, "Spi~i t ,. 
I :. 
.. 
bears witness to Spir~t: this witness js the peculiar · 
·1 ~.,. • I 
inner nature of. Sp>iri t. . In •this we'ighty idea is involved 
that religion is not brought~ into ~an from the -~utside, 
I . . . . 
• . I 
but lies hidde~ in him~ elf, in his reason, in his freedom, 
in fact." 26 It . is ·only by abstracting from this notion 
that we come to think o 'f religion 1as an. i~ediate form 
I 
of knowledge_. · 
I • · 1 
The mo.st accurate form which this mediated 
· knowledge, outlined above, assu,rne.s is in the proofs of 
the existence of God: ."The knowledge of God presents , 
itself in its most precise ~hap-e l;lnder th~ form. of the 
., 
p~oo£s of the existence of ·Gad. Here ~he knowledge o f· 
. 27 God is, represented as mediated knowledge." However , the 
·. 
. 
24Ibili. I p. 165. 
" 2 5 . • 
165 . I ~., p. 
26 Ib.' d . 1 65 .. . ~ . , p . 
" -.-- ~ 








' . , 
.1 1 ! • 
·' 
proqfs are criti_cized by Hegel as being too geometric, 
too objective, .·a~d unable to account for the inner rise 
. 
of ·. thoug.l).t to God which is essential in reU-9ion. 'The 
I 
proofs fail .to do justice to the subj~ctive Sfde of the . 
relation.' According"to Hegel, this deficiency is 
rectified in philosophical thought, for the latter is 
69 
the unity of the· _tw6 sides, of the el~vation of the spiiit 
and of the objective · content. "I, in so far as I : thin~, 
a~ myself '-this passing over, ·or ·transition, this spirituai- . · 
moveme·nt .... " 28 Hegel · now t11rns t9 ·consider: thif ~ove- . 
I 
ment. "To begin with it is empirica'l observation and 
- I 
. . 29 
reflect.ion ~" · 
(6) The ~peclfic developmen~ of the stan~point in -t~ought _ 
Reason, or, the ego as s~pr~me mediat-or, has 
, . 
emerged as the negative moment of the dialectic of . 
' Vorstellung. The dialectic of reason, the "spiritual 
·movement" mentione~ · above, Otl.t o'f '1which the true nature 
. I 
' of God, the infinite, will emerge in speculative reason, 
.. \,. . . 
. further ~evelops this antithesis or.neg~tivity . in its 
. · manifestations as ·observati'on ahd reflection; · Observation · 
. I 
~ . I 
' 28 
















\.. J ' 
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' I 
and refleGtion toget~er will constitute the. ne9ation 




This negation of n~gation occurs in the 
fo_l!owing manner .. I 
For o~servation, limited as it is to that which 
is ernpiri'cal, God does . not ex_ist positively in _consciou.s- o! 
n~ess. He exists there ~s a · hig{ler or. beyond, ·. in -relation 
. b) w'hich the observing ego conceives of itself as dependent, . 
•• I - r 
. : 
or,~negatively determined .. This negativity is ·the 
. ~ l .. I 
fund.amenta:l characteri~tic '· . . 30 of observation, aegel states. 
I , , · . . . 
Bur.there·is another sid~, .. also; namely, th~-positi~e 
• ' • I - I 
existence of· 'the ego as self-consciou~ in relation t~ .. . 
·its object. The . e_go's · recognit~c>n that these t;wo poles 
are bqth of its own, creation will 'constitut~ it~ overthrow 
' I ' ' 
as·a simple observer and constitute its emergence as the 
. ' 
-.. . . 31 
.. reflecting. or ab..so·lute ego. 'l'h'e reflecting or absolute 
I 
. 
ego further develops the antithesis of Vorstellung whife 
. . ' 
at the. same time furthering the emergence .of the. tru~, · 
... ,~ ....... ,;'1'.,. 
· u , ·,.~ 1 r.ational, - comprehension of God. · 
In obse~vation, th~ ego is at ~i:r,:s't,:' d~t,_e_rmined _ 
.. .... 
·as ~inite, or, negativ~ in relatidn to t~e infinite w~i~~ 
. is there .cort'cei ved of in ,turn, a~ . the 'necga ti ve of the . 
, ' .. 
' . 
30 . . ,.. . ~. 
Ibld. I . p. ,173 
I ' ' . . 















' \ 'fini~e and therefore, as negative ,of _negative, affirmative • 
This '-constitutes the ac.tual
1 
·limit of ·ob~ervation. 
~ \ . I 
. 
However, 
the ego's recognitio~ of itself as determined and limited 
by this infinite precipitates a swing to its own 
' 
affirmation and its emergence as a :true e'go. · The result 
- . 
_ of o}?s~ryat~on, then, -is - the eme_rgerice. of il truly 
.. 
· cons'~i tuted 'C;lnd active ego. 
., In . reflecting on thts -~nfini te, ·t-hen,, and 
recog~izi~g it as its own product, the ·ego~destroys tpe 
antithesi~ of finite and infinite, as .' that · relation had 
. ' I 
exfsted_ in pbse~y.ation, and achieves a reconciliati;n 
. . ., 
~ithi~ · if~el1. 32 - This reconciliation, howe~er, ii orily 
I 
a subjective one:: "What we _have therefore 'here is that 
' -
the finite ego, inasmuch as it ~s t~e pos~ting. of an 
intihite beyond i-ts-elf, has po$ited · the infinite itsel_f · 
as iini~e, . ·and 'is therein i~entical with itself as that 
I . . -· 
I , 
' . ' 
which.is in like .manner finite, and now a~ being identical 
I 
with the infinite becomes infinite it~elf. ~ ihis -{~ · the·· 
. I 
l • t • ' • t f ' b' • ' • . II 3 3 cu r'!nna 1ng po1n o su J ect1 v~ ty, ..• ,., 
--; 
\But, in overcomin~ . the .antithesis -of fini~e and 
- infinit·~ in such a manner, reflection only succeeds ·in 
' . . 
· Accordi~g to Hegel, ~ "the 
. ; 
32- '• 




33Ibid. , p. 187. 
\ ' I · , 








stan-dpoint · ~hich ·has : been considered is reflection in -
its completeness, the abstract·subjectivity, 'the ego, the 
·- -
absolute -idealizer, that for which all distinction, 
determination, content is ·annulled, or exists only as 
. \ 
• t d b • II 34 ' ' • • ~ b : th t h 0 f . pos1 e y 1t. . I~·1s D v1ous a · s~c a po~nt o _-
. v.tew . can only be antithetical' to religion. ·; · 
_··However, Hegel states, the difficulty with .such 
• . I 
72 
an attitude is its close px;oximity to ·_the true philosop?ical · 
vici~: 35 While r~flection has ·succeeded in uniting the 
finite and infinite - - a's the ego. or rea~on implicit - · 
I , 
'it has done so in a!l ,illicit fashion, at the e~pense of 
. . . 
all.objactivity. Having effected a union devoid of 
. . . I ... ,·. ~ 
objecti~e existen~e, reflection has suc~eeded only in 
. . f -
're_.ducing :the infinite to the -finite. 'rhe critical 
. . 
contr~diction of this view lies in ' that 11 instead of merging 
t •• ! 
the i:qdi~idual, w_hich in itself' is without support, in 
I I 
universality and getting a grasp of affirma-tion in its . 
. . 
~bsolute universalit~, in which it in~ludes th~ individual, 
. , 
it conceives of part~cularity itself as being in a.n 
. ' 36 immediate way the universal ... 
. . 
.34 rb~d. ·, p • 188. 
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Reflection has result~d in a purely subjective 
. I 
relation to God. While this . is an essential moment in 
the religious relation and one which r 'eflection· was 
~ , . . 
neces~ary in developing, '.'it i~ only when it is the 
form for an objective·content that the self-conscious 
s~iri~ ~as truth."~ 7 • I • Out• of reflection emerges the true 
I ' 
nature of the religious _relation, in speculative ~hought. 
Hegel's e~amination of the rational view of the 
ufin,ite marks the transition ·from' the .standpoint of 
reflection to that of thought prope~ or spec~lat~on. He · 
'·. 
· . ~t~tes ~hat the transition .is ·~ialectical by n~e and 
• . I 
.must be examined as such. However, here he is content 
to co'risider · only the consequences of ·such a movement, 
. . ' 
' . . 
leaving th~ dialectic to its proper place in fhe Logic . 
. , I . I • . . • 
· To actually examine · a subject rationally requires 
\ ~ • • I • • • 
that the ab~olute subjectivity of reflection be · alr~ady 
' I 
overcome. ·The E9o must recognize an objective reality· 
73 
· wh.ich it regards as true and must· recognize that reality in 
thought, or, ratiohally. . In relatiQg itself to t~e 
- .. ' 
universal the individual must become universal as·well: 
. 38 . . . 
it must exercise ' its ·capacity to reason.. ' According to 
. . ' 
Hegel this is precisel'y wha:t ·occurs as a result of the 
l . I 
religioUs at~itude, · and, : as a result~ re~igion constitutes 
. \ \ .. 
~'7rbid., p. ·192. 
38rbid., .p.· 193.·· · 
' . 
l , 
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I : I· 
I . 
. ( 
reiati6n~6! " finite and 
I - . -
I 
: I . . . 
I 
· The ab!:iolute, sta;tus .whi~h subjecti.v±ty receives 
. r I , . . 
i~ reflecti9n is .overcbme through a recognition by the. · 
~g~ ~fa non-sensible "o~j~cti~i~y~in ! generai." 39 This 
I 
. 74-
. objectivity must necessarily be recog~ized.as a un~versal, 
·of the Ego is overcome. 
. . ' . 
I ' 
T .. . 
finiten~~s or indivi~uatity 
I 
finiteness, must be overcome 
. I 
rf .the universal is to be recognized as truly . un~versal 
and existing qbjectivel~; i.e. as with God. • · 
! 
. . . 
In . relation to this objective universal t~e . "subje;ct 
. . . 
is. charactei-.ized .as thinking, ·~ 4 0 fo~, : He~el state_~, 'iThdught 
-is the ·activity of the universal, having a universal ·as' its 
' I 
·· object, (and) in thinking the object, thinking ,the 
I j I ,. 
·. 
I . I II . • • 
·· · thought of it, the relation of my personali_ty towards it 
' · 
as_ something "pa'rticul?r is . got ri'd ·.o(,· . and I assume I an . . ~ 
. . 
objectiv~ attitude; I have renounced myself gs qn individual, 
' . ' 
·renounce~ ~y particularity, and am universal, To do · this · 
. and to think thae the 'uni.vetsal is ~Y_ Obje~t _, · ,are one· and 
the .. 41 Only in thought \ the uni'versa1 achieve same .• does 
1-
j, ·1 
l) 39rbid., 194. p. 4°rb~d., 195. I • p. 
··. ' 
.·4l:rb 'd ]., . ' p. ' 195. 
; 
-. I 










' its,. complete man~festation, and,, most. 'significant of ~1):, 
,. 
only in being fully manifest is the universal truly 
. universal. Only in maki'l'lg His n~ture fully explicit 
and manif~st 1s Gog truly God. Only in thought'is t~is 
- ' . 
full explic~tion possible. The conscious recogn~tion of 
I I ' , 
this fundamental po'in.t ]Nill' constitute · th~ achievement of 
,.  
- the_ ~peculative con6eption . of religion of religion'~ 
. • I 
liberation from itself. 
This thinking relation · of th.e Ego to the· Un.iversal 
. . 
is t~e essence .of ph~losophy. It .is :also evident: in 
religion :i,n the act of worship, for in worshi·p the Ego 
' 
qives itself over to God, the, universal, renounc~s its . 
existence as a particular individual and yet remaib~ 
·affirmative and existing . in the' midst _ of yielding itself 
J.' I ' 
' . 
. . 
up to God. This is also the true finite-infinite relation, 
in which the fihite is ·contained as a moment in the 
I 
infinite, as in worship the finite i:ndividual i 1s contained 
' . 42 . in God. · Hegel · elaborates on . this point and his ela.boratioh 
' . 
. I 
~ m~y be ·said to 'f?rm the .core of the specula~ive conception 
1. I, 
q_f relig~~m 'in which religion overre·aches itself:· "Thus · 
therefore I do not go beyond the ·consciousness of . myself 
•. · 
, .. 
~ I 42 I b;d., ' 196 . 
... P• • \ . 
i ' .  
·, 
I "' · 
i ' ,  








· ,_ . 
r 1 • • 
. I 
• I 
. I . , 
.. , 
r. 
• • 0 
. • .. . 
' '- I 
... 
r 
~nd this arises from the fact that the universal qbject 
I 
. ~ .· .. 
' is now potentially thought and has the· content within 
i tse,lf, . it . is substance in· motion .within . itself '(i.e. 
. . . 
·- spirit), ~nd as an inward process in which• it begets 
. ' . 
- . ' 4 3 . 
• itS COfl.tent 1 is, not- empty 1 but-...,is . absolute ful.neSS o II ' 
. . 
· The explicat.ion of tl)is statement will · b~ the chief- task· 
, of o1,1r . examination .of the acl:lieved transf~.rrna-tion:·· of ~ · 
' ' ... 




' · (7) ~he , sp~culative spirit \ .· 
· rn making the transition · to the s·pec~lat:i.v~ or 
.._ .~ 
.,, . 
'philoso.ph.ical comprehensio~ of · rel~giQp., · in essence the 
': trans i tior1 from religian to philosophy, it is important· 
I " ' 
.. · 
. ·. 
. to note a fundamental charac~er.istic ot' :the rdialectical 
.. -6 .. • 
in~eraction o.f . form .and contert, namely., ~hat t _he 
• I . 
revel~tion of the negative character of t~e form with . 
I ' 
; • I * • • 
regard to t6e c9nten~ is equally a P?Sitiv~·~evelation of . · 
~ . . . , 
That is, not o~ly is the ~orm the nature of that content . 
. . 
transformed but tJ:ie 1 content as well, '·such· that there is 
a sense ·in which ·the ernergenc~ of each new fqrm pro~uces 




4 ~·.Ibi.d. , p. 197. .· ' 
·, 
1n reality, the increasing 
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\ 
sophisticati6n of the forms ~ake ~be content equally more 
manifest. The dialectic, then, doe~ not simply transform 
. . ~· 
. the· mo'de of' the .content while- the latter ;r:emains cbnstant 
fl 
• 0 • . • . . . 
,-,--:r-st~)i~n~ry b~t ~ns·tea~. :rodu?es, : t·~a~sforma-tio~ ·. in 
· · ~t as Jell.. Th1.s 1.s part1.culaTly 'S1.gn1.f1.cant at thl_s 
4 . 
... 
point for although we have ~tated previously·.t~at 
c.pntent o.f · reli_g,i.on and 'philosophy is the" same -~e 









Th~ ·transition to the ' form~~f specul~tio~~ thoug~t 
. . - ----------- - . proper, has revealed the inadequacy of conceiving the 
. . . . . 
' l> f·inite and .infinit? - a~ separate entities. The real · 
ryatur'e of the obj ~ct , , Go_d ..,.. for philosophy, . :the Ide~ -
does .not con"form to this expression. 45 
~ . 
f 
Ra'j:her , the . 
·- \ l 
infinite must be somprehended -~s. a dynamic unity ' which 
r> ' 
' · enGo~pas~es'· the ' fihlte i-n that unity. The true na'ture 
\ 
of God, as is revealed speculatively, is one of unity in 
~hich .~1i' ?i~tinctions are encompassed ·and prese;ved. \ , 
H'~n_~e "\ofe- mus"t;,. get rfd o~f i;:hfs .bJg-bear . of t~.e oppo~~ t~n 
. -~f f .inite >and- in-finite. n 46 This is a.chieved in the 
. . 
ratidhal conception of the object. 
' 0 \ 
\ .. 
·'ii)' . . . 
i • , 44Thi: ~oint ·;s ~~de al•L by G.R.G:. ~~re, ":egel\ 
··v_ /"'. Luther:, and the Owl of Minerva,"· Ph~1osoph:,> 41 (1966), 
. 131. .. . . 0 • • • • ,,.,. 
45 i Lect~res on the Phi1osoghy· of Religion~ V.I,(p. 199. • 
li .. 
0, '46 
. Ibid.,-p. 2100. . .. 
... 
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~' \. \, is essential to both ·religion and philosophy 
' 
· that this. opposition ?e left behind. To refuse is 1to· 
' . . 
.
1
· deny to, G~d His true nature as infinit:e~~:md un~~ersal 
and. to. ?SSert the absoluteness of the ~in_i te and . subj ~ctiye .' "·. 
. 47 
Such a "neg_ative relation of. consciousness to t~e Ab90l4te" . 
is r"oo·fed ;1n the· observatioii~l stage of consciousness' 
whic_h rs already been 'demonstratedito be destr~\ctive 
.of4ue 'religion ·. Observation, by its very nature.., must 
.. 
d·e:ri; the p'ossib_i . .fi ty: of at~ini~g '~n~ knowledge . of God. 
'" · ' . 
This ~irnit, · which ob9ervati6n places on itsel~, has · 
' already bee'n seen · to be arbitrary by nature · and pne that ' 
4
• '\', ' ' • • ~ • : • • 1 • (I • 
i~s continpal'ly gone li"~eyon~:- Ali· forms of consciousness 
.. -
have therefore be~n dis~los~~ negatively related to the 
TJ'fl'iversal and each poin'ted bey<dd i t 'self to a new' more 
adequate form or ,conception. . Reason has b~e.n revealed . 
, . . 
as the true ~orm 'and as such must no'w be considered. 
Reason . .fs the concrete form o:f religion, the 
0 . 
. I , 
result of the self-negation,- of .th.e negative forms· of· 
, ,1o . ... 
Ob$ervat~on . and ref~ection~ or the negation of negati6n.· 
p 
This · is the abst~~ct characterizatio~ of the relation of 
' ' ·. .  . ' . . 
---- .:...--. --·- - ·-- ----- -·- -
this affir~ative .attitude to · religion~ Accor~ing to 
. ' . ' ' 
· Heg~~' t t s. con6re t~ a~tribut~s a~e ~s foll~ws: "The 
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.'. consciousness. ·r~lates ·itself, h~s all conten:t w.i thin 
' . :\ . . \ . . . . 
it:;elf, and· consequently · _this . . condition ·of ~e~ation is . 
~\ ' ' ·, ' 
what is highest of- all in it,· is its absolute stand-
' 
. 48 point. II -The highest attribute of the content is this 
r:> 
relatio!} of ffnite .cons'ciousness to- it, ·a which 
itself. The most s:i,gnif:lca11:t pol:nt here is the 
. . ~. 
all content as the object of 
j . 
that while God is 
. , • . ' ' 'I' 
re1~gious iconsc.t.ol.ls·ness, He is unlike"' any oth~r o:bject 
· i~ that, posse~sing all content w~·thin Himself, He also' 
. ~ncompfs~es this ~ondition of relation. ~o~:is an 
: obje' "'for c~nsciousness whi~h en_~ompasses the CC?nscious-
ness of Him as object. Hegel ~xpres~es it thus: "As 
. Universal, it ~s pbject to itseif, &nd thus .dete~mined 
. I . · ""'--~-..1 I 
as a particular, it i~ · this individual: but as universal 
it reaches over this its' 'othe~' •o that its 'o~he~' an~ 
~ 
it~elf _are _comprised iil ~ne. · ;4 9 ij· is ·£o4 this reason 
th~t reflec~ion, which establishes ·. concretely the ·relation 
.. 
. ' 
of consciousness to · an object, solidifies the relat'ion 
. i . • 
of d.'ni te. 'and infinite. and is u·nable to c.ornprehen~ the 
true nature of G_od, the· infini e~, as ·also enaompass~ng 
I ' 
148Ibid. I p. 20~ . . : <l • . . ' 
\ 
·' 
. 49 . . 
. G.\'!.F· Hegel,· tectures 6n 'the· ·Histor·y .of Phi'l.osophy, 
trans. E. s . . Haldane .and ·Frances H. Simson . (London: 
Routle-dge ·and Ke gap :Paul, ·1968) , Vol;'. -' I, : p. 13. I · 
I . ~ . 
·., . I , .. 
" I t• 
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the ~ondition of re-lation·. Refl.~ction is unable 't8- eff.ect .· 
I . ' .,_. . · ' 50 
·.the .uniby which the true nature of· God demands. This . 
\ 
. . \ 
has been the g~e~t· f~ilure of all other forms of consc1ous-
ness a~ - ~ell. Thus reason ls the - ~o~e ~nd true home o~-
\ . ' 
» ieligion in its _concretely ~~veloped form. 
In considering the n<iture of thi·s true J?eligious 
form, it must ~-e remembered· that' religion is a · form 'of \ 
,. ab~olute mind, ,, b.£ mitfd, which_, in its ~oncre~e form·, has 
\ 
· it{;el'f as its object and is nq,.t simply consc.iousness as 
"" I such or consciousness of an object. At this stage 
' consc1ousne.ss is toerely an exp_Fession of the outward 
rn~ni.festation of mirid, · i.~dicating its essentially re.lat~onal 
• : ~ ' I ~ 
character .as knowledge of an obj'ect. . Absolute min:d is 
mind_ having .itself as it~ ob]ect and .·hence- is -knowledge 
oi . itself.~ .. I~ is th?"efo~e ina_ccur~te · to emph~si·z_e fthe 






· ind~pendent object . and therefore only a condition of · 
. finite mini-51 . Absolute mind, On the contr~ry ,: i.s ,identity 
with i_t;~elf antl as SU~h, obje~ti':'~ly existi~g ·spiri_t Of 
, · reas·on: "The relat-ion of Spirit to self alone is the · 
~ () . .i'-
""'' absolute_ det~rrnination;· .the diyine . spir;it lives in ~its 
\ . ' . 52 
own .communion and· presence. " \ 
sb . ' .. ·.". ·. "n 
L~ctures · on -the Philosophy of religion·, . Vol . . I, . p. 204 . 
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· ·1 . _ · . Religic;m, them, by virtue of its nature as a 
, ' ' 
· - ~orm of_ absolute mind, is not simply a form of conscious-
" .·. 
·nesi, but .rather; "a relation of. the spii~t ·to abs~lute 
Spirit: thus only is Spiri.t as tha-;t which know_5i- also 
. - . 53 
that .which is known." In, it~ ultimate form / it- .is "the 
Idea of the ·spirit which relates itself to · its .own self 
. . .. \ 
. t . . h 1 f . . . + b 1 ·, . '1 54 1 1s t e se · -consc1ousness -~- a so ute sp~r1t. 
· Howev~x: ,_ in that religion is a relation to the absolute 
J 
it i .s • <?Onsciousness a~d COijiSE!quently poss_esses a finite 
element; bu~ is a.lso a "con_scious·ness whic·h is cancell~d 
\ 
as··-finite;· fo_r the .ot_her ':'hic'li ·Absolut~ spirit .knows,' 
•. ' . ' 
. . 
it itse~f is, _ 'and ·it is only absolute spi_rit in knowing 
, t . . l ,f n55 
1 se . . , . . 
•·. 
81. 
'Having devel<;>ped to this stage of s~lf-con~ciousrtes.s, 
I . 
at w~ich i:t recognizes it's ' nature as a 'form of absolute 
' . -/ sp~rit, having· made itself totally' conscious of itself, 
. it.i~ in actuality no longer the · r~ligious standpoint· but 
instead th~~ ··of -p~ilo~~Ph.Y, _of -~ opennes~ of' . the na~ure ·: 
9f. A~solute Spiri~ to itself, of its ~ecognition of itself 
in the ,Ldea. · 'Havi~g 1 penetrated to the nature of the Idea 
• I 
I•• ' 
.. tfi \ . 
.. . 
I . . 
: 
53iectures: on the .Philo~ophy of R~ligiQn, Vol. t, p ·. 206. 
' ' ' ~ , 
' 1.1 • 
. \ ~:·?54 b . d :~ ·: ~-, 
' 55r.b'd 
' ' __ 1 _ . I 
. . -.1 
,• :\ 
. . 
p. 2 06. 
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. , : I 82 
-,and recognized itself in it·,. Absolute Spirit is truly 
absolute, . the unity of form and' ca"ntent, subject and object. 
' , I , 
To this goal S~rit. has been aiming·and ~he attainment of 
it nece;sarily .require-d ·. religion~ ·fo~ . in. the lat·t~. th~~.e 
., 
appeare~ _ the first true conception of the absolute as the 
• 
True which encompass~s .all. 
. . 
(8) Chri~tianity as a~solute religio~ · 
•, 
Having, in t~e. ffre.goinc_r sections, ,d~t~.~min.ed tqe 
. . 
. . ' 
nature of the relation of religion; and phi.l!osophy for Hegel . . · 
. . ( . ' . "\ 




does not arise fro!~' a. consid~ration, of the() 
.. \';. 
con~ept of religion only, _ b~t is present, H~gyl claims, 
• q j. . 
in the actual history of rel~gion itself, Aside from 
. . 
~ertain pr~lim~nary ' remarks we shail ~isiegard this h~story 
and con~entrate _ ou~ attentio~ instead bn He~el's general 
conception of C'hristiani ty, ·for i~ ifhe~e, . h~ clais, , ·r I : 
. 
that t~e history of religion reaches its end and fruition, 
.· . . 
. in t~e~attainment 0~ ~he absolute religi?n· 
Hegel cl~irns , · th~n, that th.e history ~f- religion . 
. I ' . . 1ts~lf; when . examined philosophically (i.e. f~om the 
- 1 . ~ . 
. ~?inJ of· v~ew o;f its real·~zati~n) o~eyotion)' . i~ 
the process and ~j:ruggl:e of religi.on to libera.te i.ts.eHf 
. ' . 
'from·1itself, to mak'e His object - truly manifest~and.thereb~ 
I I 
· ~~eJ.f-4c~nscio,us .. · tAcc~r~ing ·. to H~gel. th~s o~~ulf~ in 
. . . \. 
~ ( . 
_, ~hr~stiani ty c:tnd. hence his characterization of it·. as the 
6 · 
• I 0 
I . 
.·· 










( 0 83. 
Absolute religion. As a form .of absolute spirit. or mind, 
' :, . 
0 relig~on is o~ly truly .religion after a process of self- · 
production. The historical · e~ergenc~ of the va~ious 
religions are modes or manifestations of its ·development ·~~-
to compl-e.teness· as. th.e · absolute religion. Hegel refers 
' I 
_,. --------~ 
to these forms or mqdes as thos~ o·f "de~ini t~ '' re1i gion: 
"Here reli~ion is consciousness o~ :the universal sp~riti 
I 
I 
which is not as yet fully developed ~s ab's'olub.e; this : 
cQns~iousn~ss o~ Spirit at e~ch stage is ~ci~inite . conscious­
ne~s ~f itself, ·it -.. ~s the ~h of the. education of. sp~ii~.· ,;s 6 
T~e· fo~ms of defi~ite re~~on are momen~s in . the _perfected .-' 
. I ·. 0 I . 
~ religion_ wh~ch at the.~ !:!am~ ·;~i~ posse~s an indep~n?e~~ . 
- ~ I • ' • 
historical existence as distinct religions. T~ey · a~e graded 
' . 
. . . 
accbrding _to the degree to .which they conform to the 
I 
· . fiulfilled notion- of ,religi_on. Acco~di~g · to !fegei , ·. hist'br_ical: 
'Z I 1 ' 
ieligi'ops shou_ld Qe jusJged· on the basis of the t·rl!t~ they. · 
possess in comparison ,.with · the absblute re~.igion. 57 '" 
" , . . 
Of 'the·: histo~y of_ r ·eligion ~nd t~e charjlcteri·i~tf.o~ 
~ . . 
. . -
· of _the various religions nothing more will be said. Inst'ea,d 
·we wil~ . turn 'imme_d i.ately to Hegel Is char'acterizatiqn of 
I 
\ . 
- '. . ) . 










' 5 ~Ibid .. " ~-" .,1. , . -~---·~--, p. 76. 
,: --
-. . ' -
.. 
: 
L • ~ • 
, . . 
~ ~ 'I 
.. '\ . . 











" . ' 
I . i · • • • 
.• 
. I " • • • . I • 
in those f.eatures of Christianity: whi.ch demonstrate ,its 1 
' ' . 
natur~ as the absolute r~l~gion, · or the form in which 
, , I • • , . 
religion achieves · liberat.~on ;from i ts..~~f. _ To <:lo justice 
-to his treatment of Chr~stiarlity it ._ w~uld be necessary t:o 
. \ 
examine -all that he has to say concerning it: this task 
. 
is illlpossible h~re.. Not to do so, . however," is ~ to mi$~. 1 
I . • ... 
rnuch.that is interesting;and important. 
• • • • .too 





of the true nature of re-ligion, the teal,i~ation of its 
cons:=ept -or Notion. R.eligion , · Hegel_ .states, has been 
defined as "th~ self-consciousness of God ... sa' In 
Chr~stianity _ ~his conception is' real·ized.: the: tru'e nature 
.- _,. ,.- . I ' ; I 
• 
·of ··God as abs"O·l Ute Spirit is ·revea.led an~ fin'.i te sp.iri t 
comes ·to know its true relation \~i th Him as one of,, 
ins~parable uni'ty in distinction. ·T.he' separation of · 
subject ,and object · whic::h consci~u~ness gives rise t o . is 
left behind in a true concep.tiohl of God as Spirit. · -Hegel, 
• I .. 
·. charact"erizes.~>i t in the fo_llowing ·wfy. 
In Christianitr, ."it' ·is revea led 
' \ __ -·~ 
.~hat God is: 
He . is no longer a Being above and beyond this . world, a~ 
4 . • ' 
,unknown, for He has told me n what he is, and this not 
merely in an outwa~d way 
•, 
in histbr;, . but~ in ponscious.ne'ss .· " 59 
-( '' 
. ' 
58 .. . -
Lecture .. s ·. on t he P hilos"9phy o f reliCJ i o"n', Vo l . II , p . . 327. 
59 . . . 
Ib.i. d. , p . 3 2 8. 
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.. : · ~,as_ 
· . 
. , 
Further', _acco!-ding ~? H~gel, · "we have here •. ~ the religion 
I , .. . . • . . 
of the manifestation of God, since 'God knows Himsel -f in . 
. . . '/ .. ; . -. 
the fini t~ -spirit. n 60 This· means that ·God 'is revealed 
' .I> 
· s.- • • . I 
He . has ~e.;~aled Himself - and·, th,is is ·_tl)e ~s~ential . 
. ' 
I; fea'ture of th~s stage: Chi·istianity. is. ' the abs.ol~te' 
I . 
religion because il'l it G.od has rev·e~led · Hi~self· abso).-utely, ·· 
. . . .. 
·leaving nothing hiddef\. God has revealed Himself as· i 
Spirit and demands - to be worshipped in spirit. 
' . . . .... 
. \ 
In t"he· revealed . _rel i...gion the ~orrn of the · relation 
Of -C~-QSCiOU~~ess ·to ··ah --object ahd the. COnsequent reductiOn . 
r · · , \ . ., •4 
. . . . 
of both sides to · the status of finite 
.. . . . . ~ 
h~s been· qvercome . in 
' ' . i . 
_the object ?f . . _ · · . -·-. · · · . . that . 'l t · is seen. tha ~ t~e cp~tent .. and 
. ' . ' . -
\ . ' 
relig1on ·are made up · of ·-this very · whole, of 1;he conscious- · 
. .. . ...... -.. 
' 
ness which brings itself into 1rE;lation· with its .' Essence,. · 
... • • • • l 
. the knowled~e of itself as. the Essence . and of :the Es~ence · .· 
as -itself, i.e • . Spirit thus becomes th~ object in.rel~gion ... Gl : 
~ ~ -
As Spirit it is a ·uriity with ~t~elf . a~~ hen~e absol~te.· 
• - ~ I ' • ' • 
I " • ~ 
ije-nc_e, in· Christiimit}' · the un·ity of .subject and object, . \ 
. form ~nd · co~tent. 1is ·a~·~ieved; which is to say .'that God · is 
reveaied a~ - be~ng esse~tial~y Sp~rit. 
"Here f.ir~t is Spirit .as sucli the obj_ect, the contertt :of 
• • • • • J • • ~ • ~ .. 
religion, -. and Spi_rit . is o~l:y ·· ·~or Spi:r;it·,"-.62 i.~~- the u.ii}ty .· . 
. •, . 
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of form and content. In Christian~ty, then,the 
. . . -·-·'--- - ·~ 
ess.entiall~r relational character of the religious attitude 
u • " ' 
. . I . 
is overcome. "In it.the _universal . Spirit and the f.l.nite 
. . . \ 
~piri t are ini3epar_ably connected, it is their· q.~solute 
. \ \ . . . 
:· ·. identity •whic'h constitutes this religi6n and is 'its 
• 0 • 
. , .. :. :• ~ubst.ance or content. 11 ~.3 · .. This ·l~se- · point cannot be 
~ ·~m~hasfzed too muc~ for ~n c~aracterizirig Ch~isti~nity 
- • l .. • 
in this WilY Hegel is claimfng. that the . -goal of religion 
, • , , , \ • • , ' \ , I I 
.. 
·has b.een ft?.lfilled and religion has b_eco~e self..:.transparent. 
'· . 
Thi~ is as far ~s we ~ed go in ~i~cussing Hegel's 
c~~racte~ization ~f _c~ristia~i~y .. our int~n~ion _ has bee~~ 
. to point' ou't th~t .ii;, is not . only the concept of re'ligio~ 
'• '\ • , ' .. ' ': I ' • • ' - · ' • • • 
~hi~h demonstrates ~he ·, d-i~.l~ct~C-~~· .in~er : trans~Or!llation of 
reiigion into philosophy but rather · that this has bee~ the . 
' . 
whole ·aim and end of t~e 1 history of religion i£s~lf, ·a · goal 
. . ~ .. 
whicW is ~chieved in Christianity- and hen~e its charact~r as 
.the absolute religion. 





,To summarize the main . p?int ,of;our discussion ·as a 





rela~ion of· rel{gion and philosophy ~ialecti6alli. ~ ~c~otding ~ 
41 • ... ~4 .. . 
. . \ 
.. 
I t .o him,. it i ·s the · conc.eption. or notion of ·religion to 
. .. . -' . . . 
. 
become p~ilosophy. · P~ilosopby and religion .•ar~ not r~lated 
' 'I ' . 
. ). ... . 
. .. D • • e:. 
I . .... ... · 
', ,I 
. .'" '· ..  
: 
.. ' 
.. · . 







\ in_· ·any external or contingent fashion, but ra~her. , 
. I • . \ 
philosophy emerges .as 'the necessary end · or . fulfilme.nt 
of religion itself: it is the nature of »eligion to 
bec<;>me philo·sophy. 
~ ~ 
It is of the v~try ·notion . of relig.fon, 
• I . . 
both conceptually and hi'storically, to achieve this.· , .. 
iiberation· from it.self, ac~ording to H~gel.' 
' 
. T_~i1 is c-ertainly a · nove·l -idea and is one -. that 
. . 
has largely peen misunderstood or ignored. Subsequent 
·examiners . of Hegel-·' s philosophy .. have vatiously claimed 
. . ' · .. 
: •\ that he 11-as . destroyed religion, that he has deduced· 
phil~s~ from rel:igion and· that in doing· so~ he ·has . 
. . I . I ,. • I •• / 
reduced the latter to nonsense. It should be clear th'at . 
' 
Heg~l h~s don_e none of these ".things and a .closer, ·more 
. . • ' ' 1. . 
~pe_n;}e~amin.ation of his actual statern~nts ·would reveal 
dJ> ' . -
.this. qnless one i 's _prepared to admit the possibility of 
·a ... di"alectic'al ' rel~tion between ' the two .and e~a!,llin~ it ~~ 
., \ 
I 
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